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American antitrust law has undergone great change in the last two
decades, reflecting a judicial embrace of the free market ideologies
associated with the Chicago school of economics. Much of this change
has proceeded on a neutral basis, without regard to the particular eco-
nomic sector at issue. Such an approach fails to consider the uniquely
agrarian origins of antitrust law and the wider social and statutory
policies seeking to protect the economic interests of American farmers.
Creating a uniquely agrarian antitrust law would more effectively address
these concerns, advance the policies embraced by lawmakers, and bolster
the bargaining power of American farmers.
Part I of this article explains the inability of the antitrust laws to
address the economic concentration issue that has historically concerned
farmers and reviews strategies to reverse this failure by examining recent
case law. Part II strengthens the case for an agrarian antitrust by appeal-
ing to the wider statutory regime built to protect the economic interests
of farmers. Part III outlines a general theory of agrarian antitrust that
avoids many of the problems reviewed in Part I and addresses the
legislative priorities reviewed in Part II. Part III, after reviewing the
absence of agrarian considerations in merger cases, also applies the
theory to merger analysis, where it is of particular importance.
I. FARMERS AND THE PROBLEM OF ECONOMIC
CONCENTRATION
A. THE AGRARIAN BASIS OF ANTITRUST LAW
The emergence of the trusts, large corporations that dominated
many sectors of the American economy, became a critical concern in
post-Civil War politics, especially for advocates of the farmer.l In the
most famous example, John D. Rockefeller's Standard Oil company by
1878 controlled ninety percent of the nation's oil production. 2
Similarly, in the agribusiness sector, the American Sugar Refining
Company controlled eighty-five percent of the nation's sugar refining. 3
Perhaps the largest concern of farmers was the "Big Five," the group of
1. DAVID A. HOROWITZ, BEYOND LEFT AND RIGHT: INSURGENCY & THE ESTABLISHMENT 6 (1997).
Agrarian protest was rooted in the perception that monopolistic interests wielded
illegitimate and unfair control over credit, transportation, distribution, and government
policy. Farm agitation first surfaced in the 1870s when growers organized the Granger
movement, a network of rural consumer cooperatives and mutual aid societies
antagonistic to the railroads and middlemen.
Id.
2. PAGE SMm, THE RISE OF INDUSTRIAL AMERICA: A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE POST-RECONSTRUC-
TION ERA 129 (1984).
3. Id. at 130.
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Chicago meatpacking companies which dominated the slaughter of the
nation's cattle. 4
In the words of capitalism's harshest critic, this "transformation of
competition into monopoly [was] one of the most important-if not the
most important-phenomena of modem capitalist economy." 5  Long
before Lenin advanced his diagnosis and radical solution to the monopo-
ly problem, Senator John Sherman (R-OH) understood the implications
of the "power and grasp of these combinations," fearing, without legis-
lative action to reduce economic concentration, the coming of the
"socialist, the communist, and the nihilist."6 As economic concentra-
tion increased and helped usher in totalitarianism in Nazi Germany and
Soviet Russia, some American political leaders feared that similar
economic concentration jeopardized democratic government within the
United States. 7 Following in the tradition of Senator Sherman, who an-
ticipated the dangers of economic concentration, Senator Estes Kefauver
(D-TN) blamed business leaders for their shortsightedness and failure to
appreciate the "inevitable" coming of fascism or socialist nationali-
zation of the economy. 8
Farmers have been a prominent voice in such criticism. Through-
out the late nineteenth century, farmers feared the economic conse-
quences of a powerful "tyranny of monopolies." 9 Farmers initiated
demands for legislation that would reign in industrial concentration, an
4. Robert M. Aduddell & Louis P. Cain, Public Policy Toward "The Greatest Trust in the World,"
55 Bus. HIST. REV. 217, 219 (1981).
5. ROBERT H rGs, CRSls ANDL EVIATmAN: C RrrcAL E PStoEs iN TmE GROWTH oFA mERICAN GOVERN-
MENT 7 (1987) (quoting Vladimir Lenin, a year prior to the Russian revolution).
6. 21 CONG. REc. 2460 (1890).
7. Derek C. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HARv.
L. REV. 226, 235-36 (1960).
In the minds of the Congressmen [during the Celler-Kefauver debate], the growth of
these large economic groups could lead only to increasing government control; freedom
would corrode and the nation would drift into some form of totalitarianism. It was hardly
a surprise, of course, to find a finger pointed at Adolf Hitler and Karl Marx, for they
were no strangers to debates on antitrust legislation.
Id.; see also Louis B. Schwartz, "Justice" and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L.
REV. 1076, 1078 (1979) (noting "American imposition of antitrust measures upon conquered Germany
and Japan after World War II" stemming from a "desire to create alternative centers of power that
could not readily be marshalled behind authoritarian regimes").
8. 96 CONG. REc. 16,452 (1950).
9. SmrrH, supra note 2, at 431 (quoting farmers Eleanor Marx Aveling and her husband); see also
Elizabeth Sanders, Industrial Concentration, Sectional Competition, and Antitrust Politics in America,
1880-1980, 1 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 143 (1986).
For most of the United States' industrial history, the antimonopoly impulse reflected the
antagonism of the nonindustrial periphery toward the marauding rail, financial, and
industrial corporations of the Northeast-Great Lakes manufacturing belt. Antitrust law
of the populist and progressive eras represented the agrarian effort to restrain those
predations and the regional maldistribution of wealth they entailed.
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effort that produced the Interstate Commerce Commission to regulate
the railroads and contributed to the consideration of more broadly-based
monopoly legislation.10 In response to the fears of what George Hoar
(D-MS) called the "grave evil" of "vast fortunes in single hands,"
Congress in 1890 passed the Sherman Antitrust Act.ll The legislation,
according to historian Richard Hofstadter, was a "ceremonial concession
to an overwhelming public demand for some kind of reassuring action
against the trusts." 12 Such public demands were on display during the
fall elections of 1890, causing Nebraskans, for the first time, to vote
Democratic, sending to Congress a thirty-year-old lawyer from Lincoln,
William Jennings Bryan, to fight the trusts. 13 Unhappy with both politi-
cal parties' efforts to address the trust question, many farmers helped
form the People's Party in 1892, adopting the famous Omaha Platform:
"The fruits of the toil of millions are boldly stolen to build up colossal
fortunes for a few, unprecedented in the history of mankind."1 4 In
1896, a fusionist effort united Democrats and Populists, both of whom
nominated Bryan and adopted antimonopoly platforms; although he
lost, Bryan won twenty-two states and captured nearly forty-nine percent
of the vote. 15
The monopoly problem remained a prominent issue in early
twentieth century politics. President Theodore Roosevelt embraced the
image of a trust-buster, initiating over forty antitrust suits between 1901
and 1909.16 In 1911, the Supreme Court approved the divestiture of the
Standard Oil and American Tobacco trusts and established a "rule of
10. WINSTON W. GRANT ET AL., AGRICULTURAL EXPERIMENT STATION, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA,
FEDERAL ANTrrRUST POLICY AND THE U.S. FOOD SYSTEM 5 (1985).
The demands for federal antimonopoly legislation, initiated by the Granger Movement,
were refueled and carried on by others when the focal point of populism became the
trust-a development of Standard Oil Corp.-in 1882. By 1887, many great trusts had
appeared on the scene including the Whiskey Trust, the Sugar Trust, the Lead Trust, the
Cotton-Oil Trust, the Linseed Oil Trust, etc. It became obvious that the public wanted to
destroy the power of the trust just as it had wanted to destroy monopolies and railroad
pools before.
Id.; see also William D. Heffernan, Agriculture and Monopoly Capital, MONTHLY REV., July 1, 1998, at
46 (noting "[tihe whole history of the farmers' movement is largely about the unequal power balance
between farmers and all the 'middlemen' they depended on for transportation, markets, and a host of
inputs such as credit and farm equipment"); Gary D. Libecap, The Rise of the Chicago Packers and
the Origins of Meat Inspection and Antitrust, 30 ECON. INQUIRY 242, 244 (1992) (arguing that the
"[bleef trust played a more prominent role in the events leading to the enactment of the Sherman Act
than has been recognized in the literature").
11. SMrrIH, supra note 2, at 132.
12. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO FDR 245 (1955).
13. SMrH, supra note 2, at 465.
14. SMITH, supra note 2, at 466.
15. HoRowrrz, supra note 1, at 9; SMITH, supra note 2, at 549.
16. HoRowrrz, supra note 1, at 14.
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reason" analysis for future antitrust decisions. 17 The prominence of the
monopoly question in the presidential election of 1912 prompted a
range of widely-debated proposals.18 When Woodrow Wilson won the
election, he brought to Washington his "New Freedom" platform and a
strengthening of federal antitrust legislation. This included the Federal
Trade Commission Act of 1914, which established a new agency to help
enforce the antitrust laws and impressed farmers with its large-scale
investigations of the meatpacking industry.19 The Clayton Act of the
same year attempted to slow economic concentration by limiting corpo-
rate mergers and build farmer market power by exempting non-stock
farmer cooperatives from the reach of the antitrust laws. 20 This dual
approach of applying antitrust scrutiny to corporate activity while
promoting the economic organization of farmers became a standard
policy for addressing the concentration issue throughout the twentieth
century. 21
The accomplishments of this policy are in doubt. The antitrust laws
have proved a poor method of limiting and reducing corporate concen-
tration and power. The judicial embrace of efficiency and pro-competi-
tive rationales for antitrust law in the last twenty years has further limited
its effectiveness in this regard. The use of farmer cooperatives and other
means to develop the market power of farmers has also fallen short of
expectations, leaving many sectors of agricultural production highly
disorganized. The resulting imbalance in bargaining power between
concentrated buyers and disorganized sellers requires recognition in
antitrust analysis.
17. See generally United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); Standard Oil Co.
of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
18. Northern Cal. Supermarkets, Inc. v. Central Cal. Lettuce Producers Coop., 413 F. Supp. 984,
988 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (describing 1912 as the "last time antitrust was an issue in a presidential
campaign"); see also ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE P ROBLEM OF MONOPOLY: A S TUDY IN
EcONOMic AMBIVALENCE 7-9 (1966).
19. G. Cullom Davis, The Transformation of the Federal Trade Commission, 1914-1919, Miss.
VALLEY HIST. REV., Dec. 1962, at 441. "[The FTC's] first target was the meat-packing industry,
where it undertook an extensive investigation of the five largest firms. In a lengthy report, issued late
in 1919, it pointed out that the major meat packers were engaged in profiteering activities that
constituted unlawful restraints of trade." Id.
20. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1994); see also Northern Cal. Supermarkets, 413 F. Supp. at 988.
Congress, concerned about the minimal bargaining power of the individual farmer in the
markets in which he buys and sells, and in order to encourage him to form agricultural
organizations for mutual help, exempted such organizations from the application of the
antitrust laws by enacting Section 6 [of the Clayton Act].
Id.
21. See generally Jon Lauck, American Agriculture and the Problem of Monopoly, 70 AGRIC.
HIST. 196 (1996). The cooperative promotion policy is discussed in Part II.C. infra.
1999] 453
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 75:449
B. FARMERS AND THE CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR ANTITRUST
PROTECTION
Farmers continue to place great hopes in the antitrust laws.
Throughout the 1990s, they have sought greater antitrust enforcement to
alleviate the alleged abuses of large buyers of agricultural goods. 22
Farmers can draw on recent evidence of concentration, to make their
case for antitrust relief. During Congressional testimony in January
1999, farmer advocates presented the results of a recent compilation of
concentration data.23 The study indicated, for example, that five firms
conducted over eighty percent of beef packing and that six firms con-
ducted seventy-five percent of pork packing, a much larger concen-
tration rate than previous decades.24 Similarly, the four largest grain
buyers controlled nearly forty percent of elevator facilities. 25 Cargill was
among the dominant firms in all three markets, indicating the multiple
product markets occupied by many large food firms.26
22. Thomas F. Stokes, Testimony to Senate Agriculture Committee, 106th Cong. 3 (Jan. 26, 1999),
available at Organization for Competitive Markets (last visited Aug. 16, 1999) <http://competitive mar-
kets.com/testimony/ocmt4.htm> [hereinafter Stokes Testimony]; RESOLUTION CALLING UPON THE U.S.
DEPr. OF J USTICE AND THE ATrORNEYS GENERAL OF MINNESOTA, S ouTm DAKOTA, IOWA AND N EBRASKA To
INVESTIGATE COLLUSIVE P ACTICES IN THE MmwasITsR FOOD PROCESSING INDUSTIES, FOUR-STATE FARM
PRICE CRISIS FORUM (Sioux City, Iowa), Jan. 30, 1999 (on file with author); HEARTLAND PRICE ACCORD,
HEARTLAND FARM PRICE CRISIS FORUM (South St. Paul, Minn.), Apr. 18, 1999 (on file with author);
ORGANIZATION FOR C OMPETITIVE M ARKErs, R ESOLUION A DOTED AT ANNUAL MEETING, Aug. 21, 1999
(Omaha, Neb.) (calling on state attorneys general to stop agribusiness mergers); PRINCIPLES OF
AGREEMENT, 1999 NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL S UMMrr, Apr. 27, 1999 (St. Louis, Mo.) (outlining the call
of 29 farm groups for federal agencies to "monitor and investigate all mergers, ownership changes,
interlocking directorates, joint ventures and strategic alliances in the agriculture industry to determine
whether competitive markets for farmers and ranchers have beepi or will be compromised; and take
necessary steps to prevent and/or reverse such mergers and ownership changes"); Agriculture: In the
Mill, ECONOMIST, Mar. 20, 1999, at 64; Angry Farmers Give U.S. Antitrust Chief an Earful, CHI. TRia.,
Apr. 19, 1999, at 3 (describing a rally of 1,000 farmers requesting greater antitrust efforts in agricul-
tural markets); Bill Hord, Harl: Consolidation Threatens Farmers, Omaha World-Herald, Aug. 21,
1999, at 45 (explaining prominent agricultural economist Neil Harl's call for additional antitrust over-
sight for agricultural markets); Neal St. Anthony, Hatch Opposes Cargill Grain Deal; Federal Help in
Continental Purchase Asked, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), May 8, 1999, at DI (explaining the
Minnesota Attorney General's response to the antitrust concerns of farmers).
23. Ed Maixner, Ag Sector Concentration Gets More Federal Attention, FEEDSTUFFS, Jan. 25,
1999; William Heffernan, Consolidation in the Food and Agriculture System, Report to the National
Farmers Union (visited Feb. 5, 1999) <http://www.nfu.org>; see also A TIME TO ACT: A REPORT OF
THE USDA COMMISSION ON SMALL FARMS, JANUARY 1998, at 55-7, 66-7 (advocating federal action to
address the growing concentration in agricultural markets).
24. Heffernan, supra note 23, at 17; Brian Williams, Committee to Delve Into Monopoly on
Slaughtering in U.S., COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Feb. 18, 1996, at 2H (explaining that in the early 1980s the
top four packers only slaughtered 36% of all livestock).
25. Heffernan, supra note 23, at 18; see also Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Oh, Horrors! A Beverage-
Can Oligopoly, Wall Street J., Aug. 25, 1999, at A17 (arguing for reduced attention to the recent
aluminum industry mergers given the existence of powerful buyers such as General Motors, Boeing,
Coke, and Pepsi).
26. Heffernan, supra note 23, at 17-18.
454
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Congressional concern with such concentration levels, highlighted
by the pending merger of Cargill and the large trader Continental
Grain-termed the "mother of all mergers" by one farm group27-has
prompted calls for a moratorium on further mergers and acquisitions
among large food firms.28 More generally, Congressional leaders have
called on the Department of Justice to "aggressively investigate
concentration in agriculture." 29
Some economic studies indicate a strong correlation between
concentrated food firms and their profitability and market power.30
Compounding such concerns are widening gaps between retail and farm
prices. From 1984 to 1998, consumer food prices increased 3 percent,
while the prices paid to farmers for the products plunged 36 percent.31
The impact of the price disparity is reinforced by reports of record
profits among agribusiness firms at the same time agricultural producers
27. Leland Swenson, Merger Mania Troublesome for Family Producers, NATIONAL FARMERS
UNION NEWS, Jan. 1999, at 2.
28. Senators Byron Dorgan (D-ND) and Chuck Hagel (R-NE) to President Clinton, Feb. 19, 1999
[hereinafter Dorgan & Hagel Letter] (on file with author); Neal Smith (D-IA, member of Congress
from 1959- 1995) to Janet Reno, Nov. 24, 1998, available at Organization for Competitive Markets
(last visited Aug. 16, 1999) <http://competitive markets.comlpressreleases/ocmpr8.htm> (outlining
objections to the Cargill- Continental merger). See Heffeman, supra note 10, at 46 (noting that: "The
whole history of the farmers' movement is largely about the unequal power balance between farmers
and all the 'middlemen' they depended on for transportation, markets, and a host of inputs such as
credit and farm equipment"). The Farmers Union has asked that Congress "establish a percentage of
concentration that automatically triggers anti-trust action." Leland Swenson, Testimony to the Senate
Agriculture Committee, 106th Cong. (Jan. 26, 1999); see also ORGANIZATION FOR COMPETrVE MARKETS
NEWSLETTER, Mar. 1999, at 1, available at Organization for Competitive Markets (last visited Aug. 16,
1999) <http://competitivemarkets.com/newsletters/OCM-N-01.htm> (noting that Senator Byron Dor-
gan (D-ND) has considered forming an "Antitrust Caucus" in the Senate to "promote a stricter anti-
trust agenda") (on file with author). See generally Greg Gordon, Senators Rip Cargill's Grip on
Market, STAR TmiB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), Jan. 27, 1999, at Dl.
29. Press Release, Senator Tom Daschle (D-SD), Daschle Tells Senate Agriculture Committee
That Growing Industry Concentration is Contributing to Farm Crisis; Presses Committee to Take Action
to Halt Dramatic Loss of Producers, Jan. 26, 1999 (last visited Jan. 27, 1999) <www.senate.gov/
-daschle/releases>; see also Jill J. Barshay, Cargill Faces USDA Charge; Company Call Hog-Price
Complaint Technical, Plans to Appeal, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), Apr. 10, 1999, at DI
(reporting that the "Clinton administration has decided to make agricultural giants a political issue in
1999").
30. C. Robert Taylor, Economic Concentration in Agribusiness, Testimony to the United States
Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, 106th Cong. 2 (Jan. 26, 1999), available at
Organization for Competitive Markets (last visited Aug. 16, 1999) <http://competitivemarkets.com
testimony/ocmt3.htm> [hereinafter Taylor Testimony]; see also JEAN KINSEY, CONCENTRATION OP
OWNERSHIP IN FOOD RETAILING: A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE ABOUT CONSUMER IMPACT 13 (The Uni-
versity of Minnesota Retail Food Industry Center Working Paper No. 98-04), available at <http:fl
agecon.lib.umn.edu/mn/tr98-04.pdf> (last visited Aug. 16, 1999). The review concluded, however,
that studies of the relationship between concentration and profitability produced "mixed evidence"
and that "although research related to the question of monopoly power in the food industry has pro-
duced some intellectually interesting theories and measures of profitability, it has not richly informed
consumers or public policy makers about the state of the industry as it operates today." KINSEY, supra,
at 21-22.
31. Taylor Testimony, supra note 30, at 4 (concluding "There is considerable evidence that the
economic power of global agribusiness giants has increased dramatically in the decade of the 1990s").
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are suffering through. a severe economic depression. 32 This contrast in
economic health between vertically-related sectors indicates to many
observers an excess of market power in the concentrated processing sec-
tor at the expense of farmers. 33 Unfortunately for farmers, the antitrust
laws have never been able to address such concerns adequately, especial-
ly the disparity of bargaining power between individual farmers and
large-scale corporate buyers.
C. THE LIMITS OF ANTITRUST
1. "Mere Husks": The Economic Turn in Antitrust
In the last two decades, courts have incorporated l.rge a-mounts of
economic theory into their antitrust decisions. Key among these theories
have been those advanced by the "Chicago school" of economists, who
emphasized the role of economic efficiency in legal analysis, including
antitrust analysis. Along with the other works of the Chicago school,
Robert Bork's famous book The Antitrust Paradox provided much of
the ammunition for the economic turn, declaring unequivocally that
"[t]he legislative history of the Sherman Act displays the clear and
exclusive policy intention of promoting consumer welfare." 34 Such
32. Dorgan & Hagel Letter, supra note 28 (stating "While thousands of farmers are being forced
out of agriculture due to collapsed commodity prices, many of our nation's food processors are posting
exceptional returns and record profits"); see Stokes Testimony, supra note 22, at 3 (noting that "IBP
[Iowa Beef Producers] just turned in fourth quarter earnings that were four times that of the previous
year; this is at a time when hogs are literally being given away") [hereinafter Stokes Testimony]. See
generally Pam Belluck, A New Kind of Farm Crisis Pummels the Northern Plains, N.Y. TnmEs, July 19,
1998, at AIT. Belluck's article details the economic stress facing farmers:
In the last two years, according to the North Dakota office of the Farm Service Agency,
2,511 wheat and cattle farmers have folded, and an additional 1,807 are expected to quit
this year, leaving only about 26,700 farmers in this heavily agricultural state. Farm
income has nose-dived 98 percent in the state to $15 million in 1997 from $764 million in
1996, the Department of Commerce said.
Id.
Senator Kent Conrad (D-ND), Verbatim Transcript of Senate Agriculture Committee Hearing,
July 27, 1999, 1999 WL 555591, at 30 (explaining that North Dakota anticipates "losing 30 percent of
[the] state's farmers in the next 12 to 24 months"); see also Bob von Sternberg, Rob Hotakainen, and
Dane Smith, A Grim Outlook For Farmers; Crisis May Force Out 6,500 in State This Year, Figures
Show, Star Trib., Sept. 2, 1999, at Al.
33. Stokes Testimony, supra note 22, at 2 (arguing that "aggregated power resulting from intense
competition will be ruthlessly used by the powerful to the depredation of the less powerful" and that
the "problem is that the ultimate value at retail is not distributed equitably among the contributing
players. The pie is big enough, it is not being sliced reasonably"); see Saara Hyvonen, Competitive
Advantage, Bargaining Power, and Organizational Performance: The Case of Finnish Food Manufac-
turing Firms, 11 AGRIBUSINESS 333, 335 (1995) (noting that in "the vertical chain, powerful firms can
squeeze the profitability of downstream or upstream firms").
34. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADox: A POLICY AT WAR wITH ITSELF 61 (1978). It is
worth noting that many Chicago scholars were once active supporters of using the antitrust laws force-
fully to deconcentrate sectors of the economy. William E. Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The
Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcentration, 74 IOWA L.
456 [VOL. 75:449
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claims have motivated courts to search for market dynamics that pro-
mote consumer interests through economic efficiencies and lower prices.
In 1974, for example, the Supreme Court in United States v. Gener-
al Dynamics35 allowed a merger of large mining companies in spite of
high concentration levels in the industry. 36  The court weighed "other
pertinent factors," such as the large-scale changes in the coal market in
previous decades and the use of long-term contracts between coal sellers
and coal buyers. 37 It also noted that coal reserves were a better indicator
of competitive potential than past coal production levels. 38 The court
concluded that the acquired firm's reserve capacity was so small that the
firm "was a far less significant factor in the coal market than the Govern-
ment contended." 39 By considering factors beyond industrial concen-
tration levels, the Supreme Court opened the door to broader economic
analyses and theories in antitrust cases. In so doing, the Court failed to
heed Derek Bok's earlier warning about "succumb[ing] to the econo-
mists who bid us enter the jungle of 'all relevant factors,' telling us very
little of the flora and fauna that abound in its depths, but promising
rather vaguely that they will do their best to lead us safely to our
destination." 40
The indeterminacy of economic theory undermines its usefulness as
a guide to antitrust analysis. Economic analysis can produce multiple
conclusions and offers very little concrete guidance to judicial rule-
makers. In a pioneering article that contributed heavily to the early
interpretations of section 7 of the Clayton Act, Bok highlighted the
problem of relying on economic theory. Given the "aura of complicat-
ed uncertainty" surrounding the competitive effects of a merger, he
believed that reliance on economic analysis would cause "confusion
rather than enlightenment." 4 1 Thus, he believed that by attempting to
incorporate economic "expertness we may only end in extravagance." 42
REV. 1105, 1134 (1989) (explaining that from the "1930s through the early 1950s, Chicago acade-
micians such as Frank Knight, Henry Simons, Jacob Viner, and George Stigler developed economic
arguments for expanded attacks on bigness").
35. 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
36. See generally United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
37. General Dynamics, 415 U.S. at 499-500 (explaining the declining demand for coal due to
competition from oil and gas and the increasing use of long-term coal contracts which reduce the
amount of coal available for purchase on the "spot" market); see also E. Thomas Sullivan, The Eco-
nomic Jurisprudence of The Burger Court's Antitrust Policy: The First Thirteen Years 58 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1, 40-41 (1982) (explaining that "the court in General Dynamics held that post-acquisition evi-
dence of reserve capacity, rather than market share data, was the most relevant economic data in
determining future competitive effect in the coal market," indicating a "greater receptivity to a wider
range of competitive criteria leading to a more broadly-based analytical style").
38. General Dynamics, 415 U.S. at 502.
39. Id. at 503.
40. Bok, supra note 7, at 227.
41. Bok, supra note 7, at 349.
42. Bok, supra note 7, at 349.
1999] 457
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Economic assumptions about the behavior of actors in particular con-
texts, as the Supreme Court more recently conceded, must be accepted
"on faith." 43 The embrace of economics, according to the current
chairman of the FTC, requires the incorporation of "large doses of
hunch, faith, and intuition." 44
Although couched in terms of scientific objectivity, Chicago eco-
nomics involves value choices. Instead of supplying a rational approach
that rises above personal or political preferences, Chicago economics
involves its own kind of subjectivity. Economic analysis is built on
numerous assumptions and depends upon the interpretation of confus-
ing and contrived information. 45 For example, the assumption that
people are "economically rational," an assumption crucial for Chicago
economic theory, often falls short of expectations. 46 Similarly, firm
managers, who are assumed to make profit-maximizing choices, may in
fact choose, for a range of reasons, to make unprofitable decisions.4 7 In
the context of mergers, the goal of profit maximization may be subordi-
nated to other motivations, such as an "ego trip for prestige and
power-hungry managers." 48 Similarly, the assumption that potential
43. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 479 (1992).
44. Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1065 (1979). See
generally John Cassidy, The Decline of Economics, NEW YORKER, Dec. 2, 1996, at 50-60 (recounting
the poor performance record of many economic schools of thought and the increased mathematical
theorizing which has undermined the practical usefulness of economics).
45. Wesley A. Cann, Jr., Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Pursuit of Economic 'Objectivity':
Is There Any Role for Social and Political Values in Merger Policy? 60 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 273, 295
(1985).
The lack of perfect information regarding market conditions and consumer/supplier
response, combined with a host of interpretations of that information, invariably requires
that choices among various alternatives be made. As economic analysis becomes more
sophisticated and the number of relevant economic factors continues to increase, the
number of options confronting decision-makers will also multiply. As the ability to
exercise such discretion increases, so does the vulnerability of the decision-making
process to social and political bias. That merger policy tends to change with changes in
administrations seems to support this conclusion.
Id.
46. Id. at 297.
47. Id. (noting that "a manager might decide not to enter a particular market for a variety of
reasons, such as failure to recognize the opportunity, a fear that prices might later return to their
original level, poor health, advanced age, or satisfaction with the status quo"); see also Herbert
Hovenkamp, Rationality in Law & Economics, 60 GFO. WASH. L. REv. 293, 294 (1992).
48. FREDERICK S CHERER, INDUsTRIAL MARKET STRucrTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 563 (2d ed.
1980); see RICHARD POsNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS oFLAw 418 (4th ed. 1992) (noting that "some eco-
nomists believe that in large, publicly held corporations managers are only weakly constrained, and do
in fact choose maximands such as sales, or growth, or personal power that may bring them close to
personal utility maximizing than profit maximizing would bring them"); Alan A. Fisher & Robert H.
Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1582, 1584 (1983) (noting
that "economists and lawyers during the 1960s typically believed that the primary motives for mergers
were concerns unrelated to efficiencies, such as corporate managers' empire building and firms'
desires to increase their market power or gain tax advantages"); see also Willard F. Mueller, Market
Power and Its Control in the Food System, 65 AM. J. AGRiC. ECON. 855, 860 (1983).
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entrants will undermine collusive arrangements in a market was recently
exposed in the Microsoft trial as an analytical factor that can cut both
ways.49
The shifting economic doctrines underlying antitrust are the best
indicators the economic indeterminacy problem. During the New
Deal-after an episode in which government policy was actually to
encourage price fixing-antitrust policymakers embraced the economic
theories of Joan Robinson and Edward Chamberlain, which ultimately
evolved into the "workable competition" policy of the 1950s. 50 Con-
trary to "discovering" economic theory in the last two decades, antitrust
policymakers have simply "changed theories." 51 It could be said that
the rise of the Chicago school is simply a return to the economic theories
of the late nineteenth century, 52 highlighting the multiple economic
theories that can be employed in antitrust cases. Economist Donald
Dewey concludes that it is the
height of arrogance for an economist, by remonstrance or
innuendo, to chide Congressmen and judges for failing to
accept immediately the truths that it took his trade the better
part of a hundred years to learn. The judicial economics that
The discretionary power of conglomerate management can be used to satisfy their
whims, fancy, and personal ambitions, as manifested by experience in many mergers and
acquisitions. Much of this behavior can better be explained by sociologists and psycholo-
gists than by the economist. Occidental Petroleum's 1981 acquisition of Iowa Beef Pro-
cessors, Inc., the country's largest meat packer, lacked any obvious efficiency gains
from combining meat packing and petroleum extraction and distribution; its explanation is
found in the minds and personal ambitions of Occidental's chairman and Iowa Beef's
largest shareholder, long-time personal friends.
Mueller, supra, at 860. Mueller notes that the "chief beneficiaries of these mergers are the top execu-
tives, investment bankers, accounting firms, and law firms specializing in takeovers." Mueller, supra,
at 860-61.
49. Massachusetts Institute of Technology economist Richard Schmalensee testified for Micro-
soft that the Linux operating system posed a threat to Windows. Prosecutors then quoted Bill Gates
saying that "I've never had a customer mention Linux to me." Prosecutors then cited an academic
article by Schmalensee arguing that "[t]here is a substantial difference between toehold entry and
substantial entry that provides real pressure on established firms' profits." Schmalensee then testified,
notwithstanding the earlier Linux comment, that no potential entrant met the test of substantial entrant.
Joel Brinkley, Microsoft Witness Attacked for Contradictory Opinions; Economist Is Said to Have
Shifted Stance, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1999, at C5. See generally DONALD DEWEY, THE ANTITRUST
EXPERIMENT IN AMERICA 43 (1990) (concluding that "much of what passes for economic analysis in
antitrust cases, has come to be a kind of window dressing").
50. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. R EV. 213, 221-22 (1985)
(noting how President Roosevelt, during the late 19 30s, utilized "a different group of economists who
were much more aggressive in their antitrust enforcement goals. Their work became the basis for the
workable competition' theory that dominated antitrust policy in the 1950s").
51. Id. at 222-23.
52. Id. at 220 (explaining that during "roughly 1890-1930, American economists developed a set
of theories that found consumer benefits in concentration and large firms probably to a greater extent
than did any economic model until the rise of the Chicago school"). However, economists at the time
thought antitrust was wise. DEWEY, supra note 49, at 25 (explaining that "[s]omewhere between 1900
and 1920, majority opinion among American economists swung behind antitrust. The acceptance was
rapid and total").
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Robert Bork treats with such scorn is, after all, the blue-ribbon
opinion in economics of a generation back.53
With the embrace of economics, according to Frederick Rowe, the
former chair of the American Bar Association's Antitrust Section, anti-
trust law "bound itself to a delusion." 54 For this, Rowe blames the New
Dealers who embraced both the economics of the 1930s and other
theories, prominent at the time, linking economic concentration to inef-
ficiency and corporate sloth.5 5 A core component of deconcentration
efforts in the 1940s involved "antitrust law's assimilation of econo-
mics." 56 The economics changed over time, however. The coming of
the Chicago school and its emphasis on economic efficiency produced
different results in antitrust cases. 57 Economics, according to Rowe,
fulfilled the "Faustian pact of the forties," and "the servant bec[ame]
the master, first abetting, then usurping, antitrust law."58 This usurpation
has left the antitrust laws, in the words of Justice William Douglas, "mere
husks of what they were intended to be." 59
2. Non-Economic Considerations
The embrace of economics also precludes other policies embedded
in the Sherman Act.60 Contrary to the scholarship of Robert Bork and
others, the legislative history of the Sherman Act does not support a
singular pro-consumer agenda concerned with economic efficiency. 6 1
53. DEWEY, supra note 49, at 51.
54. Frederick M. Rowe, The Decline of Antitrust and the Delusions of Models: The Faustian Pact
of Law and Economics, 72 GEo. L.J. 1511, 1513 (1982).
55. Id. at 1520.
56. Id. at 1522. As Rowe write:
Contemporary economic learning facilitated this grandiose antitrust design. Then in
vogue among economic scholars, the Oligopoly Model linked anticompetitive behavior to
the 'structure' of concentrated markets dominated by a few large producers. In theory,
those few sellers instinctively collaborated to maintain the high prices and low output
typical of class monopolies. Guided by oligopoly teachings, antitrust campaigns against
economic concentration promised not only to improve competition, but also to preserve a
pluralistic polity. A heady brew of ideology and learning, it inspired a missionary
generation of economists and lawyers with a messianic vision that propelled antitrust for
thirty years.
Id.
57. Id. at 1569 (calling this "vendomat jurisprudence: a model is plunked in, a legal result pops
out").
58. Id.
59. WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS, 1935-1975: THE AtrroBoGRAPHY OF WILLIAM 0.
DOUGLAS 162 (1980).
60. See generally Rudolph J. Peritz, A Counter-History of Antitrust Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 263;
Pitofsky, supra note 44, at 1051.
61. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust's Protected Classes, 88 MIcH. L. REV. 1, 28 (1989) (noting,
"There is no evidence of any organized consumer lobbying for the Sherman Act"); Rowe, supra note
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Senator George (D-MS) thought the Sherman Act "ought to be direct-
ed" at the "organized force of wealth and money" which "crushed
out" its smaller competitors. 62 Such sentiment existed in the face of the
pro-consumer impacts of the trusts, such as consumer price reductions.
Congressman Mason, referring to the Standard Oil trust, stated that "if
the price of oil, for instance, were reduced to one cent a barrel it would
not right the wrong done to the people of this country by the 'trusts'
which have destroyed legitimate competition and driven honest men
from legitimate business enterprises." 63
The legislation's namesake, Senator John Sherman, also did not
emphasize pro-consumer and efficiency rationales. In his Senate speech
on the issue, Sherman denounced the "kingly prerogative" of those
men with "concentrated powers: [W]e will not endure a king over the
production, transportation, and sale of any of the necessaries of life." 64
Such sentiment belies Bork's interpretation of Sherman's singular
focus on economic efficiency. Compounding doubts about Bork's
interpretation are Sherman's tariff views, which were protectionist and
anticompetitive. 65 Commentators at the time specifically linked the trust
and tariff questions together, highlighting the anti-consumer conseq-
uences of allowing high tariffs to protect trusts. 66 Finally, the pro-con-
sumer interpretation is weakened by evidence that prices of consumer
products such as sugar and oil were falling when the Sherman Act was
passed.67
54, at 1559 (noting the minimal involvement of economics in the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890:
"Nothing in antitrust's genesis foretold a fusion of law and economics, or the rise of economists as
vicars of antitrust policy").
62. 21 CONG. REC. 3147 (1890).
63. 21 CoNG. REC. 4100(1890).
64. Thomas W. Hazlett, The Legislative History of the Sherman Act Re-Examined, 30 ECON.
INQUIRY 263, 267 (1992); see also David Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1219, 1278 (1988). During the Sherman Act debate, Senator Jones stated:
Now, however, having been allowed to grow and fatten upon the public, [the monopo-
lies'] success is an example of evil that has excited the greed and conscienceless
rapacity of commercial sharks until in schools they are to be found now in every branch
of trade, preying upon every industry, and by their unholy combinations robbing their
victims, the general public, in defiance of every principle of law or morals.
Millon, supra, at 1278.
65. Hazlett, supra note 64, at 268 (quoting Sherman's view that tariffs would "protect, foster, and
diversify American industry").
66. Hazlett, supra note 64, at 269. "Knowledge of the tariffs anticonsumer consequences was
entirely common. The New York Times, for instance, made a near-crusade out of highlighting the
pro-monopoly impact of protectionism, and in tying the trust question to the tariff." Hazlett, supra note
64, at 269.
67. Hovenkamp, supra note 61, at 29. According to Hovenkamp:
Most of the contemporary evidence established without controversy that prices were
indeed falling, a fact that contemporary economists readily confirmed. In fact, 'ruinous
competition' was perceived to be a much bigger threat than high prices. So to posit that
Congress' principal concern in enacting the Sherman Act was high consumer prices is to
suggest that Congress was dealing with a problem that did not exist.
Hovenkamp, supra note 61, at 29.
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Scholars have exposed the many weaknesses in Bork's analysis.
For example, Robert Lande's exhaustive review of the subject shows that
Bork overlooked a great deal of evidence indicating that Congress hoped
to arrest the growing tendency to transfer wealth to the economically
powerful. 68 Other scholars have gone much farther, arguing that the
Sherman Act was a sociological statute which sought to preserve the
individual entrepreneurship and small-town life which big business
threatened. 69 The non-economic mission of the antitrust laws was
especially evident during the debate over the Celler-Kefauver Amend-
ments of 1950, which prohibited corporate mergers that might have
substantially lessened competition. Arguing in the wake of a world war
against Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan-regimes characterized by
concentrated wealth and political authoritarianism-legislative leaders
highlighted the importance of dispersed economic and political power to
a functional democracy. 70 The dominance of non-economic concerns
in the debate over the Amendment contrasted sharply with "the paucity
of remarks having to do with the effects of concentration on prices,
innovation, distribution, and efficiency." 71
Courts also have often recognized the non-economic considerations
inherent in antitrust law. 72 In some of the earliest Sherman Act juris-
prudence, the Supreme Court worried about "driving out of business the
small dealers and worthy men whose lives have been spent therein." 73
Perhaps most famously, in the Alcoa case of the 1940s, Judge Learned
Hand observed, "It is possible, because of its indirect social or moral
effect, to prefer a system of small producers, each dependent for his
success upon his own skill and character, to one in which the great mass
68. Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The
Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 105 (1982).
69. Millon, supra note 64, at 1219-28; Eleanor M. Fox, Mergers 'R Us; Has Antitrust Gone the
Way of the 5 & 10?, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 1997, at C1. See generally Kurt J. Meister, Note, Time for a
Change in the Antitrust Laws Affecting Horizontal Mergers, 3 HARV. J. L. PUB. POL'v 255, 267-69
(1980) (recognizing the protection of small business and the equal distribution of wealth as antitrust
goals).
70. Bok, supra note 7, at 306. "There can be little doubt that the dangers resulting from further
concentration weighed heavily in the minds of all who supported the amendment. Rightly or wrongly,
it was repeatedly declared that increases in the market power possessed by large firms would
jeopardize several of the nation's most fundamental ideals." Bok, supra note 7, at 306. Such ideas re-
ceived scholarly support. Eugene Rostow, The New Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress,
14 U. CHI. L. REV. 567, 569 (1947) (noting the importance of achieving a "wider dispersal of power
and opportunity, and a broader base for the class structure of our society, by a more competitive
organization of industry and trade, in smaller and more independent units").
71. Bok, supra note 7, at 236.
72. National Broiler Mktg. Ass'n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, 829 (1978) (Brennan, J., con-
curring). "The Sherman Act was the first legislation to deal with the problems of participation of small
economic units in an economy increasingly dominated by economic titans." Id.
73. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 323 (1897).
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of those engaged must accept the direction of a few," 74 a consideration
sure to be ignored in the recent aluminum industry consolidations. The
Warren Court's interpretation of the Celler-Kefauver Amendments of
1950 also upheld the non-economic policy rationale of the statute. In
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,75 the Warren Court noted the
importance of Congressional goals such as economic "decentralization"
and the "maintenance of fragmented industries and markets," despite
the potential for higher costs and prices.76
Ignoring non-economic factors is an especially troublesome lapse
when considering agriculture. What Andrew Jackson termed the "pro-
ducing classes," with the farmer as archetype, have always held a privi-
leged ideological position in the American republic, especially over
those classes who work with paper and economic matters. 77 The impor-
tance of farming in American life has earned it the designation of "The
American Ideology," the view that "life necessarily begins and properly
ends on the farm."78 A healthy agricultural sector has historically been
linked with a functional American republic, 79 making it an important
consideration in antitrust law. 80
3. The Oligopoly Problem
Despite Congressional concern with what the Supreme Court called
the "rising tide of economic concentration," 8 1 the antitrust laws have
been ineffective at reducing oligopolies-markets with so few firms that
any of them can greatly affect the market conditions. 82 Oligopoly
74. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416,427 (2d Cir. 1945).
75. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
76. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962); see also Sullivan, supra note 37,
at 37 (noting that "[tihe Court's seminal merger case is Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, where the
Court fully embraced a Brandeisian multi-faceted analysis designed to further industry concentration,
disperse economic power, and protect small business").
77. ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY
BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 15 (1970).
78. Jim Chen, The American Ideology, 48 VAND. L. REV. 809, 817 (1995) (criticizing the
ideology).
79. See generally A. WHITNEY GRiswOLD, FARMING AND DEmOCRACY (1948).
80. Jane B. Baron & Jeffrey L. Dunhoff, Against Market Rationality: Moral Critiques of Econom-
ic Analysis in Legal Theory, 17 CARDOZO L. R EV. 431, 451-462 (1996) (explaining the importance some
critics have assigned to considering the impact on republican institutions, and other non-economic
factors, when conducting an economic analysis of law).
81. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 315.
82. GEORGE STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUsTRY 270 (1968). "The Sherman Act appears to
have had only a very modest effect in reducing concentration." Id. Section one of the Sherman Act
requires an explicit "agreement" and section two requires market power for single-firm
monopolization. SULLIVAN & HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY AND PROCEDURE 736 (1994)
(explaining that "[t]here is little separate case law on the offense of conspiracy to monopolize,
because any imaginable multi-party 'conspiracy' to monopolize would also constitute a combination in
restraint of trade under section 1, where the burden of proof is generally much lighter").
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arrangements are common throughout the American economy, but a
convincing anticompetitive rationale justifying legal action remains elu-
sive. Economists have often recognized the extreme difficulty of pre-
dicting the behavior of firms in oligopoly settings. 83 While maintaining
hope of finding some helpful theories, a leading industrial organization
economist concedes that "virtually anything can happen."84
The theory of oligopolistic interdependence, prominent from the
New Deal until the coming of the Chicago school, held that oligopolistic
firms would price similarly to avoid triggering a price war. 85 Such tacit
collusion would preclude gatherings in smoke-filled rooms required to
fix prices and thus make Sherman Act enforcement, which requires
actual "agreement," extremely difficult.86 Interdependence theories,
however, have been weakened by those who emphasize the frequency of
differentials in market share and cost structure among firms, factors that
can unravel tacit agreements. 87 Predicting the correct response to the
pricing moves of other competitors in the market is also very compli-
cated and undermines the effectiveness of tacit collusion. 88
In spite of economic arguments about the difficulties of coopera-
tion and the tendency to cheat among cartel members, collusion in oli-
gopolistic settings can work. 89 In the most famous case, OPEC, oil-
exporters are often able to reap monopoly profits by colluding. 90 Closer
83. SCHERER, supra note 48, at 151.
84. SCHERER, supra note 48, at 151; SULLIVAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 82, at 876. "The problem
of judicial remedy in cases of oligopoly pricing has been often analyzed and considered insoluble."
SULLIVAN & HovENKAMP, supra note 82, at 876. The collected evidence relating to collusion had an
"unfortunate tendency to support virtually any conclusion." Peter Asch, Collusive Oligopoly: An
Antitrust Quandary, 2 ANTmUST L. & ECON. REV. 53, 65 (1969).
85. SCHERER, supra note 48, at 155.
86. SCHERER, supra note 48, at 156. Section 1 of the Sherman Act requires the finding of an
agreement.
87. SCHERER, supra note 48, at 157, 160.
[W]hen cost functions and/or market shares vary from firm to firm within an oligopolistic
industry, conflicts arise that, unless resolved through formal collusive agreements,
interfere with the maximization of collective monopoly profits. And if left unresolved,
these conflicts may trigger myopic, aggressive behavior that drives the industry away
from the joint-maximizing solution of its price-output problem.
SCHERER, supra note 48, at 157.
88. PosNER, supra note 48, at 298. "The firm must figure out not only how the competitor will
react to a given price move but how the competitor will react to its reaction to competitor's reaction,
and so on ad infinitum." PosNmR, supra note 48, at 298.
89. SCHERER, supra note 48, at 169-70; Leonard W. Weiss, The Structure-Conduct-Performance
Paradigm and Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1104, 1106 (1979) (reviewing 46 concentration/profit
studies and finding that the "bulk of these studies yielded significant positive relationships between
concentration and profits or price-cost margins"); see also Michael Freed et al., The Detection and
Punishment of Tacit Collusion, 9 Loy. CONSUMER L. REP. 151, 154 (1997).
90. SCHERER, supra note 48, at 173; Walter Adams & James W. Brock, The 'New Learning' and
the Euthanasia of Antitrust, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1515, 1529-32 (1986) (recalling the failure of competition
in the oil industry); Agis Salpukas, Oil Producers Agree to Trim Output to Help Bolster Prices, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 13, 1999 (outlining a new OPEC plan to cut production by another 2 million barrels per
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to farmers, the ready-to-eat (RTE) cereal market in the 1960s and 1970s
seemed to maintain a system of price leadership that fostered collusive
behavior.91 Kelloggs led twelve of fifteen cereal price increases between
1965 and 1970.92 General Mills followed the price increase nine times
and Post followed ten times. 93 Courts have noted the continuation of
price leadership in the industry in more recent years. 94 In another
market important to farmers, lysine, Archer-Daniels-Midland (ADM) was
found guilty of fixing prices during the 1990s in a three-year inter-
national conspiracy with four Asian companies. 95 When ADM and
Ajinomoto executives met in the proverbial smoke filled room, competi-
day); see also Anthony DePalma, Diamonds in the Cold; New Canadian Mine Seeks Its Place in a
DeBeers World, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1999, at CI (noting the diamond "cartel's tight grip on the
market"). "For more than 65 years, DeBeers has had a near monopoly on the world's supply of rough
diamonds, in some years handling upward of 80 percent of the uncut stones sold to dealers and
polishers around the world." DePalma, supra, at Cl.
91. SCHERER, supra note 48, at 182.
92. SCHERER, supra note 48, at 182.
93. SCHERER, supra note 48, at 182. Concerns about collusion in the RTE cereal industry in the
1970s prompted the consideration of shared monopoly theories at the FTC.
94. State v. Kraft Gen. Foods, 926 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). In a case in which price
coordination was found to be unlikely, a Federal District Court found continued price leadership
"competitively neutral," refusing to find an "inference of impermissible coordination":
Generally, Kellogg and General Mills are the first to announce changes in wholesale list
prices. Post and other RTE cereal manufacturers often follow wholesale price increases
by Kellogg and General Mills, but they do not do so all the time, or across the board.
Nabisco and Ralston generally react to wholesale price increases at about the same time
as Post. It is rational and profit-maximizing for a manufacturer the size of Post to
'follow' generally the price movements of the larger firms.
Id. at 342 (rejecting a challenge by the Attorney General of New York to the merger of Kraft and the
cereal division of Nabisco). In order to argue that the acquisition of Nabisco would not undermine
competition, the court concluded that Nabisco was a price "follower," never a price "maverick,"
failing to see the irony of using price following as an indication of competition. Id. at 342-43. The
court's appointed expert expressed concerns about such activity, but since he did not believe
disallowing the merger would increase competition-since Nabisco was a price follower-he
concluded that a separate Nabisco would not change competition within the industry. Id. at 351. The
court took this conclusion to support its finding that the merger did not hurt competition, failing to see
the contradiction with the larger conclusion the court made about competition in the industry. Id. at
352; see also Mclver v. General Mills, Inc., No. B097951, 1997 WL 314376, at *8 (Cal. App. 2d Dist.
Jan. 6, 1997) (granting summary judgement against plaintiffs in pricing fixing claim against RTE
cereal manufacturers after prohibiting discovery because it was "not likely" to produce usable infor-
mation, notwithstanding the improbability of finding usable evidence of price-fixing without intensive
discovery). The plaintiff's argument was largely based on the investigations of Congressman Sam
Gejdenson(D-CT) and then-Congressman Charles Schumer (D-NY), who authored the report "Con-
sumers in a Box: A Consumer Report on Cereal." Id. at *2. The defendants relied heavily on the
analysis in State v. Kraft General Foods. Id.
95. Angela Wissman, ADM Execs Nailed on Price-Fixing, May Do Time; Government Gets
Watershed Convictions, But Company Still Dominates Lysine Market, MERRILL'S ILL. LEGAL TIMES,
Oct. 1998, at 1.
Since the Justice Department's investigation into possible antitrust violations into the
corn-based products of lysine, citric acid and high fructose corn syrup become public in
1995, ADM has been the subject of 65 private lawsuits and three foreign government
investigations. ADM has been the subject of 31 private antitrust suits involving the sale
of high fructose corn syrup, 21 suits involving lysine and 13 suits involving citric acid,
according to ADM's March 1998 quarterly report.
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tive Chicago assumptions did not prevail: "So the question is how do we
share th[e] growth [in the lysine market]? What would you be willing to
accept and what would we be willing to accept?" 96 An ADM executive
further made clear his company's intention of punishing any firm that
attempted to cut prices.97
Game theory, which attempts to predict the multiple strategic
reactions of firms in various economic contexts, has also been applied to
oligopoly settings, bringing a new sophistication to the economic analy-
sis and providing another rationale for oligopolistic cooperation. The
absence of formal agreement, a necessary element under section one of
the Sherman Act, does not necessarily mean an absence of coopera-
tion. 98 According to game theory, firms can deduce the appropriate,
profit-maximizing conduct from the behavior of other firms in the
market. 99 At the same time, game theory also indicates that oligopolistic
firms can devolve into price wars.l 00 The oligopoly riddle thus rein-
forces the indeterminacy problem already discussed, deprives policy-
makers of a coherent economic theory on which to base antitrust action,
and leaves many markets concentrated, dashing Congressional hopes of
addressing concentration levels.
4. The Oligopsony Problem
Of particular concern to farmers is the concentrated power of the
firms who buy their products. Excessive buyer power can lead to
oligopsony, a market condition in which each of a limited number of
buyers is strong enough to influence the market but not strong enough
to ignore competitors' reaction to the exercise of such influence. Anti-
trust commentary, however, deals almost exclusively with the power of
sellers and injuries to consumers. 0 1 Such an emphasis fails to consider
96. Id.
97. Kurt Eichenwald, Evidence Emerges on Inquiry Involving Archer Daniels, N.Y. TPMES, July
10, 1998, at D3.
98. Peter Huber, Competition, Conglomerates, and the Evolution of Cooperation, 93 YALE L. J.
1147, 1157 (1984) (reviewing ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUrION OF COOPERATION (1984)) (arguing that
the "instability of cartels and the inevitability of competition within oligopolies and contract-rigging
consortiums may be only myths").
99. Id. at 1160. "The absence of direct communication between firms does not foreclose cooper-
ation. A capacity to observe the conduct of one's rivals is the only type of communication really
needed. Cooperation is promoted, first and foremost, by meaningful patterns of behavior." Id.
100. Id. at 1168. "All commentators recognize that the performance of isolated oligopolies is
indeterminate. In some instances, oligopolies work 'well' for the participating, cooperating firms; in
many others, price or non-price competition develops and erodes profits." Id.
101. Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Antitrust Policy and Monopsony, 76 CORNELL L. REV.
297, 298 (1991); James Murphy Dowd, Oligopsony Power: Antitrust Injury and Collusive Buyer
Practices in Input Markets, 76 B.U. L. REV. 1075, 1078-79 (1996). "Conventional wisdom denigrates
the importance of oligopsonistic conduct. Courts have hesitated to apply the antitrust laws to instances
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economic injuries to farmers, probably the strongest constituency behind
the passage of the Sherman Act. Both buyers and sellers should qualify
for protection under Learned Hand's expansive description of the wider
justification of the Sherman Act: "[A]mong the purposes of Congress
in 1890 was a desire to put an end to great aggregations of capital
because of the helplessness of the individual before them." 102 Even
Holmes, no friend of the antitrust laws and their social purposes, recog-
nized the negative effects of a wide power differential between all market
actors, not solely sellers and consumers. 103 He understood the unfairness
and the potential for exploitation when a disorganized economic sector
faced a concentrated sector. 104 Holmes' concerns have been interpreted
as a forerunner to the famous countervailing power theory advanced by
John Kenneth Galbraith. 105
Soon-to-be Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg once high-
lighted the bargaining power inequality between sellers and buyers with
reference to his field, labor, describing "the managers of big, powerful
enterprises" facing down the "leaders of weak, divided and helpless
unions." 106 The observation is also applicable to the relationship
between powerful food processors and disorganized farmers, and the
of oligopsonistic collusion in all but the most obvious and detrimental cases." Id.
102. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d Cir. 1945).
103. Alfred S. Neely, "A Humbug Based on Economic Ignorance and Incompetence"-Antitrust
in the Eyes of Justice Holmes, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 1, 2 (noting Holmes' comment that antitrust was "a
humbug based on economic ignorance and incompetence") (quoting Letter from Oliver W. Holmes,
Jr. to Sir Frederick Pollock (Apr. 23, 1910), in 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK 1874-1932, at 132 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1941)).
104. Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (Mass. 1896).
One of the eternal conflicts out of which life is made up is that between the effort of
every man to get the most he can for his services, and that of society, disguised under the
name of capital, to get his services for the least possible return. Combination on the one
side is patent and powerful. Combination on the other is the necessary and desirable
counterpart, if the battle is to be carried on in a fair and equal way
Id.
105. Spencer Weber Wailer, The Modern Antitrust Relevance of Oliver Wendell Holmes, 59
BROOK. L. REV. 1443, 1459-64 (1994). See generally JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITAL-
ISM: THE CONCEPTOF COUNTERVAILING POWER (1954); Albert J. Ortega, Jr., Discussion of Bruce
Marion, Government Regulation of Competition in the Food Industry, 61 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 191
(1979).
Countervailing power is more equitable and reasonable than trying to force one group to
remain 'competitive' when that group has to deal (either by purchasing from or selling
to) with firms that have market power. Today, countervailing power is difficult to obtain.
In my opinion, not only does antitrust legislation limit to ability to challenge entrenched
monopoly power, but the entrenched power has the political influence to see that
countervailing power is held down.
Ortega, supra, at 191.
106. Arthur Goldberg, The Role of the Labor Union in an Age of Bigness, 55 Nw. U. L. REV. 54,
54-55 (1960). See generally Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, A Bargaining Analysis of American Labor and
the Search for Bargaining Equity and Industrial Peace, 91 MICH. L. R EV. 419, 492 (1992) (noting that
the labor laws were designed to "promot[e] greater equity in bargaining power between employers
and employees").
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Clayton Act recognized such a similarity by exempting both unions and
farmer organizations from the antitrust laws. 107
Power differentials have been recognized in non-agricultural con-
texts. In merger cases, for example, some defendants argue that the
merger will produce efficiencies due to the increased market power of
the combined firm, resulting in greater bargaining power with other
market participants and thereby lowering costs. 108 Judge Posner has
recognized that the potential success of horizontal collusion is under-
mined by the presence of powerful firms in vertical markets. 109 George
Stigler, in one of the more famous attempts to make sense of the oligop-
oly problem, also noted the importance of seller organization to the
potential success of buyer collusion."l 0 Despite this recognition, how-
ever, merger decisions seldom consider the impact of greater horizontal
concentration on suppliers, such as farmers selling into concentrated
meatpacking or grain processing markets."'l
Since oligopsony power involves reducing the prices paid to sellers,
such as meatpackers colluding to keep cattle prices low, 112 it can be very
elusive to antitrust investigators who look favorably upon markets in
which prices are falling."l 3 The reduction in prices creates a potential
controversy over injury since plaintiffs must suffer a harm that the
107. Robert F. Lanzillotti, The Superior Market Power of Food Processing and Agricultural Sup-
ply Firms-Its Relation to the Farm Problem, 42 J. FARM ECON. 1246 (1960) (noting the "aggravating
infjuence of market power imbalances" for farmers and the means for addressing the imbalance:
"[building] countervailing power through direct or indirect government action or special additional
antitrust immunities for agriculture, and [working] to dissolve or lessen the market power of groups to
whom the farmer sells or from whom he buys"); see also Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1994).
108. Joseph F. Brodley, Proof of Efficiencies in Mergers and Joint Ventures, 64 ANTITRUST L.J.
575, 581 (1996).
109. POSNER, supra note 48, at 288.
Finally, the structure of the buying side of the market is important. If there are many
buyers of equal size, then cheating on the cartel will require many transactions and the
chance of detection by the other members of the cartel will be great. But if there are
few (major) buyers, a member of the cartel may be able to cheat just by luring one or
two customers away from another member of the cartel.
POSNER, supra note 48, at 288.
110. STIGLER, supra note 83, at 39-63.
111. Cann, supra note 45, at 275-76. In the economic assessment of mergers,
little concern is given to such non-horizontal effects as foreclosure of equal access to
potential suppliers and customers, trends toward vertical integration, reciprocal buying,
and entrenchment, all of which stem from either vertical or conglomerate mergers. The
pursuit of efficiency is substantially encouraged, while the necessity of making any type
of 'value judgement' is allegedly extinguished.
Cann, supra note 45, at 275-76.
112. Bruce Marion, Interrelationships of Market Structure, Competitive Behavior, and Market/
Firm Performance: The State of Knowledge and Some Research Opportunities, 2 AGRIBUSINESS 443,
449 (1986). "At least four studies have examined the relationship between packer buying concentra-
tion (or the number of buyers) and livestock prices. All found prices were negatively related to buyer
concentration." Id.
113. Blair & Harrison, supra note 101, at 299.
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antitrust laws were "intended to prevent."' 14 It is not immediately
obvious that lower prices to suppliers meets this requirement. Even a
monopsonistic arrangement, in which the products of several sellers are
sought by only one buyer, may remain competitive in the output market,
further camouflaging collusive activities directed toward input sellers. 115
In spite of problems with proof, standing and detection, the exercise of
market power by buyers, similar to that of sellers, carries economic costs
in the form of reduced supplier output."16
Despite limited commentary, some courts have recognized potential
abuses by powerful buyers. In the early 1940s, for example, sugar beet
farmers in California filed suit against three sugar refiners for fixing the
price they would pay for sugar beets. 1 7 Due to the perishability of
sugar beets and refiner control over the supply of seeds, farmers were
forced to sell to the refiners or quit farming. 118 By fixing the price to be
paid to farmers, the "last vestige of local competition [was] removed and
with it the only competitive opportunity for the grower to market his
product."119 The Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act applied to
price-fixing among buyers, even though the injuries were sustained by
"sellers, not customers or consumers," 120 and the Court specifically
noted that sellers are to be protected by the Sherman Act.121 The Court
also highlighted the market dominance of the refiners and noted the
difficulties of entering the sugar refining business due to large capital
114. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977); Blair & Harrison,
supra note 101, at 337 (noting that such an argument "misinterprets Brunswick").
115. Blair & Harrison, supra note 101, at 322.
116. Blair & Harrison, supra note 101, at 316 (using the example of wheat growers to explain the
economic cost of buyer collusion).
But collusion creates expectations that have long-run significance. As their profits are
reduced by collusion, the producers' incentives to plant durum wheat diminish and they
will curtail supply in the future. Such reductions in supply entail adverse consequences
for consumer welfare in the future. This analysis suggests that the National Macaroni
decision, which reached its result by adhering to the bright-line test prohibiting price
fixing, is sensible even under modem economic analysis. It implicitly recognizes that,
even in cases where supply is fixed and reductions in quantity are not possible in the
short run, monopsonistic collusion harms consumers by reducing the producers' profits,
causing them to reduce supply in the future. Consequently, such restraints decrease
consumer welfare in the long run and should be prohibited.
Blair & Harrison, supra note 101, at 316.
117. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 222 (1948).
118. Id. at 223.
119. Id. at 240.
120. Id. at 235.
121. Id. at 236. "The statute does not confine its protection to consumers, or to purchasers, or to
competitors, or to sellers." Id.
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requirements.1 22 The Court took these facts seriously, stating that it
refused to "ignore the facts of industrial life."1 23
In a similar case, the FTC sought a cease-and-desist order against
manufacturers of spaghetti and macaroni who were fixing prices for
durum wheat, semolina, and durum flour. 124 The suit named as defen-
dant the National Macaroni Manufacturers Association, whose eighty-
five members manufactured seventy percent of the nation's macaroni. 125
The manufacturers sought to avoid high supply prices by blending
durum wheat with hard wheat when durum prices increased, a practice
which cost wheat farmers significant profits.' 26 To this end, the Associa-
tion met in Minneapolis in 1961 and agreed to send an "expression of
opinion" to wheat millers and members of the Association about the
appropriate blend of durum and hard wheat to be used in macaroni
manufacturing.1 27 Using blended wheat allowed the Association to
"ward off price competition for durum wheat in short supply by lower-
ing total industry demand to the level of available supply." 128 The FTC
concluded that by fixing the composition of their most important raw
material, macaroni manufacturers substantially affected the price of
durum wheat, a conclusion with which the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals agreed. 129 The court thus recognized the power of monopsonis-
tic buyers in the agribusiness sector to undermine farmers economically.
Similar arguments were at work in recent antitrust litigation in the
meatpacking sector. Beginning in 1977 and extending throughout the
1980s, cattle sellers pressed a lawsuit claiming major meatpackers
colluded to keep prices low. 130  Cattle producers argued that the major
packers colluded by following the prices reported in the National
Provisioner, a publication which listed some of the prices paid for cattle
by buyers.131 While the lawsuit was dismissed due to the absence of
enough proof of agreement on the prices to be paid, the court recog-
122. Id. at 240; Dowd, supra note 101, at 1090 (elaborating on barriers to entry such as the costs
of licensing, building distribution networks, economies of scale, and sunk costs).
123. Mandeville Island Farms, 334 U.S. at 244.
124. National Macaroni Mfrs. Ass'n v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 345 F.2d 421, 422 (7th Cir.
1965). Semolina originates from the middlings of durum wheat in granual form. Id. at 424. The
highest quality macaroni is made from 100% semolina. Id. When durum is blended with other wheats,
the quality of the macaroni is reduced. Id.
125. Id. at 423.
126. Id. at 424 (explaining that the Secretary of Agriculture, when asked by the Association to
reduce durum wheat exports as a way of moderating wheat prices, refused due to the discriminatory
impact on farmers).
127. Id. at 424-25. "Nearly all of the durum wheat ground in this country is ground by seven
mills in the Minneapolis, Minnesota area. These mills are associate members of Association." Id.
128. Id. at 426.
129. Id.
130. In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation (BIAL), 907 F.2d 510, 511-12 (5th Cir. 1990).
131. Id. at 512.
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nized that other uses of the National Provisioner indicated a great
potential for colluding on cattle prices, a recognition that weakened the
logic of the court's final holding.132 The court, despite showing evi-
dence of parallel pricing between the Iowa Beef Producers (IBP) and the
National Provisioner, granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs,
weakening the cases' precedential value.133
The case's precedential value is further limited by the plaintiffs'
poor litigation strategy.1 34 On the claim that meatpackers maintained
oligopsony power in the market for cattle, for example, the plaintiffs
only named IBP and Excel-Cargill as defendants, excluding the two
other major packers and a large number of very small packers.1 35 As a
result, the Fifth Circuit could dismiss the claim by citing the theoretical
possibility that oligopsonistic pricing on the part of IBP and Excel-
Cargill would trigger higher offers from other packers and undermine
the arrangement.136 The confusing nature of the plaintiffs' case and the
harshness of the court's grant of summary judgement create doubts
about the merits of the decision, particularly in light of recent thinking
about the potential for collusion in concentrated markets and the
importance placed on understanding the nature of oligopsony.
During the summer of 1999 a federal court. in South Dakota ruled
on the constitutionality of a South Dakota price reporting law passed
during the 1999 legislative session in response to concerns about price
manipulations by large packers.137 While not an antitrust ruling, the
court did note the large amount of buying power possessed by packers.
The court explained the absence of bargaining power on the part of
farmers, who "are unable to set their prices but must rely on what buyers
132. Id. at 513-14.
The cattlemen point us to no comparison of pricing activity which demonstrates a
three-way correlation between the prices quoted by the Yellow Sheet [National
Provisioner], those paid to cattlemen by IBP, and those paid to cattlemen by Excel.
Instead, they attempt to show that both packers used the Yellow Sheet price when selling
beef to each other, for individual corporate bookkeeping purposes when making
intracorporate transfers of beef from a packer's slaughtering division to its fabrication
division, and for assessing the job performance of its cattle buyers. These pricing
activities do not reflect the prices actually paid to cattlemen.
Id.
133. Id. at 514 (noting a study indicating a 97% correlation between 113P and National Provision-
er prices between 1975 and 1978).
134. The plaintiffs claimed that IBP was both a monopsonist and an oligopsonist, causing the
court to highlight the "contradictions in (the plaintiffs'] theory." Id. at 514-15; see also Dowd, supra
note 101, at 1107.
135. BIAL, 907 F.2d at 516.
136. Id.
137. See generally American Meat Institute v. Barnett, No. 99-3017, 1999 WL 734962 (D.S.D.
Aug. 31, 1999) (upholding the statute's price reporting provision; holding the statute's prohibition on
discriminatory pricing to be a violation of the commerce clause).
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will pay," and concluded that "[p]ackers have the market power in each
livestock market to influence or determine prices paid to producers for
livestock." 138 In the context of South Dakota farmers, the court noted
the existence of an "oligopsony" among the state's three packers.139
Notwithstanding the outcome of the meatpacking case, some courts
have continued to notice the problem of monopsony. In the early
1980s, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals condemned an agreement
among pulp companies to depress the prices paid to loggers in
Alaska.14 0 The court noted that the pulp companies persisted in collud-
ing from 1959-75, even in the face of a "chronic shortage of timber that
persisted throughout that entire period." 141 Similar to the complaints of
livestock producers in recent years, the pulp companies "created a net-
work of 'captive' loggers heavily indebted to the defendants. With a
drop of the executioner's sword, the defendants could cut off a logger's
financing, force the logger out of business, and acquire the company or
its assets." 142 The companies also used their control of timber supplies
to stifle the entry of new pulp mills into the market, 143 casting doubt on
theories that predict the collapse of oligopsonistic arrangements with
entry, or the threat of entry, of new firms into the market.
In yet another case involving disorganized producers selling to
large processors, California fishermen sued Star-Kist Foods, Ralston
Purina and other buyers for colluding to limit the price of tuna. 144 The
court dismissed the case, however, because it held the plaintiffs were not
part of the class protected by the antitrust laws.145 The proper class
would have been the owners of the tuna boats, as they were the parties
who actually sold the tuna for lower prices than they would have other-
wise received.146 The court did not link greater profits on the part of
boat owners to greater economic compensation or security for the fisher-
men who worked on the boats, 147 declining to do so on the grounds that
138. Id. at *2.
139. Id.
140. See generally Reid Bros. Logging Co. v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 699 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1983).
141. Id. at 1296-97 (explaining the degree of collusion by noting that out of 143 timber sales by
the Forest Service between 1959 and 1975, the defendants only bid against each other three times).
142. Id. at 1298.
143. When a Japanese company opened a new mill, one of the pulp companies informed timber
suppliers that anyone supplying timber to the mill would automatically be forced to repay all debts to
the pulp mill. Id. at 1297. The new mill was forced to sell out to the defendants. Id. Five other mills
were also forced to close. Id.
144. See generally Eagle v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc., 812 F.2d 538 (9th Cir. 1987).
145. Id. at 541 (requiring that class members "prove that they were sellers in the raw tuna
market").
146. Id. at 540-41.
147. The fishermen noted that their compensation was linked to the amount of fish caught on a
voyage, specifically connecting their economic well-being to the selling conducted by the boat
owners. Id. at 541.
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it refused to recognize an "indirect" injury.14 8 It is not clear why the
boat owners, who were directly injured, did not sue themselves.
The results have been different in cases without the direct injury
problem. For example, in a California case involving the merger of
large rice milling facilities, the court recognized that California growers
would face problems finding buyers other than the few large mills that
dominated the market. 14 9 The court also noted that rice millers under-
stood their monopsonistic position, knowing they were the "only good
outlet for the California growers."150 Large investments in rice growing
operations limited the ability of growers to switch to other crops,151
conferring a greater degree of bargaining power on millers. Entry into
the milling market was also deemed to be unlikely due to the expense of
building a mill and the difficulty of establishing a grower base from
which to buy rice. 152 The resulting reduction in competition caused the
court to find a violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act. 153
The importance of the buyer-seller dynamic has also been recog-
nized in the field of health care. The Clinton administration's proposed
health care reforms, for example, were premised on the organization of
health care buyers into alliances that could more effectively bargain with
health care providers. 154 Nationwide, the nearly one million state em-
ployees have already effectively organized themselves to enhance their
purchasing power. 155 In order to enhance the power of health care
buyers, policymakers discussed a specific antitrust exemption for buyers
wielding monopsony power. 156 The First Circuit Court of Appeals also
considered the monopsony issue in health care when it rejected a claim
by doctors that Blue Cross wielded too much buying power.15 7 The
decision highlighted one of the difficulties encountered in monopsony
cases: judicial reluctance to take action where prices are low and reliance
148. Id. at 541-42.
149. United States v. Rice Growers Ass'n of Cal., No. Civ. 5-84-1066-EJG, 1986 WL 12562, at
*4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 1986). "California rice growers normally would have no good alternative
purchasers if the California mills were to lower their compensation for paddy ('unmilled') rice by a
small but insignificant amount." Id.
150. Id. at "5.
151. Id. at *6.
152. Id. at *12. "New entry into the business of acquiring, milling and selling in California rice is
not likely due to the length of time and capital expense of building a new mill." Id.
153. Id. at * 11 (finding that the merger would have left three firms with 95% of the rice market).
154. Frances H. Miller, Health Insurance Purchasing Alliances: Monopsony Threat or Procom-
petitive RXfor Health Sector Ills? 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1546, 1547 (1994).
155. Id. at 1554.
156. Kevin E. Grady, The Role of Antitrust in a Reformed Health Care System, 8 ANTrrRUsT 2, 3
(1993).
157. Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., 749 F.2d 922, 927-28 (1st Cir. 1984) (concluding that
doctors could still "sell" to other health care buyers and that plaintiffs failed to establish any
"predatory" pricing activities).
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on Bork's scholarship on the consumer rationale of the Sherman Act.158
Such decisions stymie a wider application of monopsony theory.
D. RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FARMERS AND ANTITRUST
LAW
1. Power-Buyer Considerations
Recent antitrust jurisprudence has given greater attention to the
relative strength of firms in adjacent markets. The recognition of bar-
gaining power disparities between buyers and sellers could signal greater
attention to the problem of disorganized farmers selling into concen-
trated markets occupied by powerful firms, especially if specifically
linked to monopsony theory.
Judicial recognition of bargaining power issues has come in the
form of a defense to challenged mergers. 159 Courts have entertained the
argument that the larger, more powerful firms resulting from mergers
may be acceptable if the firms to which they sell also possess market
power.160 In United States v. Country Lake Foods, Inc., 16 1 a case involv-
ing the merger of two firms in the fluid milk processing industry, the
court recognized the ability of large food corporations who bought milk
to check the power of milk processors. 162 The court noted the "ex-
tremely concentrated" nature of the food processing industry in the
relevant market, where the top-three concentration ratio was over ninety
percent.163 The size of the food firms and the volume of their purchases
allowed them to monitor milk prices, making them "very sophisticated
buyers."1 64 The court noted their ability to switch to other milk proces-
158. Id. at 930-31.
159. Mary Lou Steptoe, The New Merger Guidelines: Have They Changed the Rules of the
Game? 61 ANTrrRUST L.J. 493, 493-94 (1993).
Although the power-buyer defense may appear to be a judicial creation that has only just
emerged within the last two years, it actually reflects an underlying trend in merger law,
present since General Dynamics, toward a more searching examination of the economic
conditions that affect a seller's ability to exercise market power.
Id.
160. United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1990). In Baker Hughes,
now-Justice Thomas endorsed the consideration of a "variety of factors" in merger cases, including
buyer power, and rejected the "fixation" on singular factors such as market entry. Id.; see also FTC
v. Elders Grain, Inc., 868 F.2d 901, 905 (7th Cir. 1989) (recognizing that the industrial dry corn
industry was unlikely to be cartelized given the nature of their buyers, "a handful of large and
sophisticated manufacturers of food products").
161. 754 F. Supp. 669 (D. Minn. 1990).
162. See generally United States v. Country Lake Foods, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 669 (D. Minn. 1990).
163. ld. at 674.
164. Id.
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sors and to enter the processing market themselves. 165 The market entry
of the large food processors would be aided by their capital resources,
which would allow them to purchase an existing plant, and by their
existing customer base. 166 The court therefore found the power-buyer
defense the "most persuasive argument" advanced by the proponents of
the merger. 167
Commentators have also elaborated on the potential power of
certain buyers. For example, buyers are particularly adept at checking
the power of concentrated sellers when the price of the item in question
is widely known.168 In Country Lake Foods, the milk buyers could esti-
mate the cost of processed milk based on the price paid for raw milk
(since prices are publicly reported) and switch to a different seller if
prices were deemed to be priced oligopolistically.169 In addition to
switching to a new seller, buyers could induce the market entry of
additional sellers by extending long-term contracts or financing the
start-up of new sellers. 170 Large buyers could support the merger of two
smaller sellers who, when their assets are combined, could more effec-
tively compete against larger sellers in the market.1 71 Large buyers
could also enter or threaten to enter the upstream market themselves. 172
This option is limited, however, by potential entry barriers in the
upstream market and the sunk costs of starting a new firm.173 Further,
courts must insure that the power buyers are competitive, in order to
prevent two oligopolistically-organized, vertically-related sectors from
cooperating to share profits to the detriment of the ultimate consumer. 174
Implicit in the recognition of the power-buyer defense is the
assumption that powerful firms in a market can exploit small and dis-
organized firms in a vertically-adjacent market. In other words, the
power-buyer argument provides a rationale for halting the growth of
165. Id.
166. Id. at 680.
167. Id. at 679; see also Luciano Venturini, Countervailing Power and Antitrust Policy in the
Food System, paper presented at the Sixth Joint Conference on Food, Agriculture and the Environ-
ment, hosted by Center for International Food and Agricultural Policy, University of Minnesota,
Aug./Sept. 1998, available at <http://agecon.lib.umn.edu/mn/c6vent0l.pdf> (last visited Aug. 16, 1999)
(elaborating on the power dynamics between food manufacturers and retailers, but ignoring supplier
concerns).
168. Steptoe, supra note 159, at 496.
169. Steptoe, supra note 159, at 496.
170. Steptoe, supra note 159, at 501.
171. State v. Kraft Gen. Foods, 926 F. Supp. at 325, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). Safeway and Kroger,
major buyers of RTE cereals, supported the merger of Kraft, which owns Post, and the cereal division
of Nabisco because "it makes Post a stronger competitor to Kellogg and General Mills," which sell
60% of RTE cereals. Id.
172. Steptoe, supra note 159, at 499-500.
173. Steptoe, supra note 159, at 500.
174. Herbert Hovenkamp, Mergers and Buyers, 77 VA. L. REV. 1369, 1382-83 (1991).
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powerful agribusiness processors at the expense of the thousands of
farmers who sell to them. In United States v. United Tote, Inc., 175 the
court rejected the power-buyer defense because it recognized the relative
disorganization of the buyers of the product at issue, the totalisator,
which manages betting at race tracks.1 76 The court held that because so
many buyers were present in the market and the buyers possessed
different levels of sophistication, they could not constitute a legitimate
check on the power of the sellers.1 77
Similarly, in the recent case FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 178 the
D.C. Court of Appeals considered the potential power of firms who
bought drugs from the four largest wholesale distributors of drugs in the
nation. 179 While the court noted the power of certain buyers in the
market, it also considered the numerous independent pharmacies that
lacked the power to bargain effectively with the large wholesalers.1 80
The existence of a large number of buyers and the presence of many
small independents created a "fragmented" buying sector unable to
counter the power of the wholesalers.181
In tandem with judicial recognition of the importance of monopso-
ny power, the buyer-power defense creates a rationale for scrutinizing
the power of buyers relative to sellers. Thousands of individual farmers,
for example, are hard-pressed to muster the market power necessary to
check the powerful food companies who buy their products. Farmer
marketing is characteristically disorganized and "fragmented," similar
to the accounts of the totalisator and wholesale drug buyers in United
Tote and Cardinal Health. Since farm prices are publicly reported, buy-
ers are also aware of any efforts to seek higher-than-market-prices and
175. 768 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Del. 1991).
176. United States v. United Tote, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 1064, 1065 (D. Del. 1991).
177. Id. at 1085.
[T]he totalisator market does not consist of a few, very large consumers. In stark
contrast, the totalisator market consists of over two hundred fifty-five pari-mutuel [the
most common form of wagering on horses] facilities, only thirty-nine of which have
average daily handles in excess of I million dollars. Even if the Court were to accept
United Tote's argument that the owners of these large, sophisticated facilities would be
able to protect themselves from any anti-competitive price increase, this would still leave
at least one hundred nine facilities unprotected in the small market segment alone.
Id.
178. 12 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
179. See generally FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
180. Id. at 60 (noting that "[i]ncreasingly, the 27,000 independent pharmacies in the United States
today are joining buying cooperatives which, in turn, are consolidating to try to develop greater buyer
power," but concluding that "independent pharmacies have little leverage, as evidenced by the
considerably higher upcharges they have to pay in comparison to the retail chains and institutional
GPOs").
181. Id. at 61 (holding that the "existence of the independent pharmacies and the smaller hospitals
makes the wholesale market considerably fragmented and remarkably similar to the market described
in United Tote").
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can immediately switch to a different seller, dramatically lessening the
prospects for seller power. Consideration of the nature of farmer market-
ing in agribusiness merger cases would allow courts to predict more
accurately the ability of agribusiness firms to behave oligopolistically.
Moreover, courts would more faithfully carry out the intentions of
lawmakers to promote the bargaining power of farmers.
The existence of bargaining power by some of the farmers in a
market would not necessarily justify a merger in the adjacent food
processing sector. In the context of meatpacking mergers, courts could
consider the relative organizational power of sellers, taking into account
the existence of sellers such as large feedlots and smaller, independent
feeders. Commentators have noted that where some buyers are sophisti-
cated and others are not-parallel to the situation of large feedlots and
smaller feeders selling to the concentrated packer industry-the
power-buyer defense should not be allowed. 182 Similarly, where many
independent feeders exist alongside larger feedlots, courts should be
skeptical of applying a seller-power defense given the potential to
exploit smaller sellers. In Cardinal Health, for example, the court noted
the potential to abuse independent pharmacies despite the existence of
other large buyers.183  In another context, the Supreme Court has
recognized that the existence of some sophisticated purchasers in a
market does not necessarily mean enhanced bargaining power for the
unsophisticated, who may lack important information required to make
proper-market decisions.184 Similar to the situation between feeders with
different levels of market power and meatpackers, the Supreme Court
explained, "[I]f a company is able to price discriminate between sophis-
ticated and unsophisticated consumers, the sophisticated will be unable to
prevent the exploitation of the uninformed."1 85
In markets where sellers are better organized, courts can lower the
level of scrutiny applied to mergers. In a case involving Archer-Daniels-
Midland's (ADM) long-term lease of two corn wet-milling plants from
Nabisco, for example, a court refused to find that the merger violated
section 7 of the Clayton Act and considered the organization of the
182. Steptoe, supra note 159, at 502.
Relatively few industries will sell solely to large customers. Far more common will be
situations in which some buyers are large and some are small. In such cases the large
buyers may be able to protect themselves from supracompetitive pricing while the small
buyers cannot. If the seller is able to price-discriminate between these two classes of
customers, it will be able to raise the prices that it charges the smaller buyers.
Steptoe, supra note 159, at 502.
183. Cardinal Health, 12F. Supp. 2d at 59.
184. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 475 (1992).
185. Id.
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firms who sold to ADM.186 The plants in question manufactured high
fructose corn syrup (HFCS), a substitute for the sugar used in food and
beverage production.1 87 Between 1978 and 1984, Coca Cola and Pepsi
replaced all of the sugar in their soft drinks with HFCS. 188 Despite high
concentration levels in the HFCS industry,1 89 the court allowed the
merger, citing the presence of "powerful buyers" in the beverage
industry, which purchased seventy percent of HFCS.190 The consoli-
dation of firms that bought HFCS in the years preceding the case
strengthened the court's argument.191 Smaller, fragmented bottlers also
began to form cooperative buying pools to counter the power of the
HFCS manufacturers.192 The "sophistication and bargaining power" of
the buyers thus reduced the potential for anticompetitive behavior
among HFCS producers.193
The bargaining power concerns embedded in the power-buyer de-
fense have not been considered in the context of farmers. In the ADM
case, for example, the court failed even to mention the impact of the
merger on corn growers or to consider the potential for market power
among corn sellers. Similarly, in Cargill v. Monfort, 194 the Supreme
Court allowed the merger of major meatpackers without considering the
impact on the farmers who sell to the merged firm. The court con-
sidered solely the impact of the merger on other firms in the industry.
The recognition of the selling capabilities of farmers and the potential
for monopolistic abuse as a consideration in agribusiness mergers could
change the case law.
186. See generally United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 781 F. Supp. 1400 (S.D. Iowa
1991).
187. Id. at 1407; see also Archer-Daniels-Midland, 866 F.2d at 242 (finding sugar and HFCS to
exist in separate product markets).
188. Archer-Daniels-Midland, 781 F. Supp. at 1408.
189. Id. at 1413 (the four largest HFCS firms, ADM, Staley, Cargill and CPC International, were
responsible for 87% of the production in 1989).
190. Id. at 1416.
191. Id. (noting the large reductions in the number of soft drink bottlers, food corporations,
dairies, and bakeries).
192. Id. at 1417.
193. Id. at 1422 (quoting FTC v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 1990-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 69,239,
at 64,852, 64,855, 1990 WL 193674 (D.C. Cir. 1990) and noting the relevance of power-buyer
considerations in the Merger Guidelines). Using the same logic, the Ninth Circuit rejected a claim of
monopsony power among movie theaters in Las Vegas, noting the power and sophistication of "giant
film distributors like Columbia, Paramount and Twentieth Century-Foil," "humongous national
corporations with considerable market power." United States v. Syufy Enterprises, 903 F.2d 659, 661,
663 (9th Cir. 1990). Unlike the case of farmers, however, the movie sellers did not complain about
receiving lower prices. Id. at 669. The court also found entry into the Las Vegas market to be easy.
Id. at 666-67.
194. 479 U.S. 104 (1986).
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2. Information Asymmetries
Courts in recent years have also considered the importance of
information disparities in markets. Rejecting the utopian assumption of
"perfect information" prevalent in economic theory increases the
possibility of a more sophisticated economic analysis, one that takes into
consideration the limited information available to individual farmers
relative to the buyers of their products. The leading case in this area is
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services,195 which "revolution-
ized antitrust jurisprudence." In Kodak, the Supreme Court expanded
the notion of market power, an element critical to most antitrust viola-
tions, to include information. The controversy related to the information
possessed by buyers of copy machines at the time of purchase. 196  The
Supreme Court recognized that buyers' ignorance of the market for
service and replacement parts for the copy machines distorted market
choices.197 The Court noted the difficulties of assessing information
such as the relevant costs and the long-term requirements necessary for
choosing a durable good such as a copy machine.198 The Court also
explained that once a decision to purchase a copy machine was made,
consumers were often locked into their decision due to the high costs of
switching to a new machine. 199
The Kodak decision recognizes a fundamental economic point
raised in the economics literature in the 1960s, when information studies
still occupied "a slum dwelling in the town of economics." 200 As
195. 504 U.S. 451 (1992); see also Michael S. Jacobs, Market Power Through Imperfect Informa-
tion: The Staggering Implications of Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services and a Modest
Proposal for Limiting Them, 52 MD. L. REV. 336 (1993); Mark R. Patterson, Product Definition, Product
Information, and Market Power: Kodak in Perspective, 73 N.C. L. REV. 185, 187 (1994) (arguing that
Kodak "incorporated into antitrust law a body of economic teachings on product information that the
Court had previously neglected").
196. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451,473 (1992).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 473-74.
In order to arrive at an accurate price, a consumer must acquire a substantial amount of
raw data and undertake sophisticated analysis. The necessary information would include
data on price, quality, and availability of products needed to operate, upgrade, or
enhance the initial equipment, as well as service and repair costs, including estimates of
breakdown frequency, nature of repairs, price of service and parts, length of 'down-
time,' and losses incurred from downtime. Much of this information is difficult-some of
it impossible-to acquire at the time of purchase. During the life of a product, com-
panies may change the service and parts prices, and develop products with more
advanced features, a decreased need for repair, or new warranties. In addition, the
information is likely to be customer-specific; lifecycle costs will vary from customer to
customer with the type of equipment, degrees of equipment use, and costs of downtime.
Id.
199. Id. at 476.
200. STIGLER, supra note 82, at 171; Patterson, supra note 195, at 187.
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George Stigler pointed out, market sellers do not simply accept the offer
of the highest bidder. 20 1 Finding, or searching for, the highest bidder is
a costly process, involving significant transaction costs. 202 Time is
perhaps the largest expense, 203 especially for sellers of perishable prod-
ucts. When the prices paid for a commodity vary widely, indicating that
some sellers did not find the highest bidders in the market, information
problems are likely present. 204 That some sellers did not search for
higher prices may mean that they concluded the cost of the search would
outstrip any potential returns from higher prices. 205 One method of
reducing the problem of poor information and the resulting "price
dispersion" is the centralization of knowledge in one identifiable loca-
tion,206 a solution similar to the recent calls for the mandatory reporting
of prices paid by meatpackers. 207
Judicial recognition of the importance of information in markets
adds an element of realism to often simplistic economic assumptions, but
it is also difficult to translate into judicial rules. Some commentators
found the Kodak decision "profoundly disturbing," expressing deep
concerns about the potential jurisprudential and administrative chaos
resulting from information considerations. 208 Most markets, after all, are
beset with information shortages. To strive for anything approaching
perfect information would thus involve significant costs. 209 Kodak pro-
vided few specifics about the nature of imperfect information, opening
the door to a variety of cases involving elusive information issues and
much greater judicial uncertainty. 210 The additional factual questions to
be sorted out would involve significant legal expenses. 211
Recognizing information problems is easier in some markets than in
others. In the case of agricultural markets, for example, the problem
may be prominent enough to avoid the parade of horribles presented by
the critics of Kodak. Agricultural markets are defined by stark informa-
201. STIGLER, supra note 82, at 171.
202. STIGLER, supra note 82, at 171.
203. STIGLER, supra note 82, at 175.
204. STIGLER, supra note 82, at 172.
205. STIGLER, supra note 82, at 175.
206. STIGLER, supra note 82, at 172, 176.
207. S. 19, 106th Cong. § 6 (1999) (requiring meatpackers to report prices paid for livestock);
Steve Marbery, Debate Over Price Discovery Enters Critical Round, FEEDSTUFFS, June 1, 1998.
208. Thomas C. Arthur, The Costly Quest for Perfect Competition: Kodak and Nonstructural
Market Power, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1994).
209. STIGLER, supra note 82, at 188. "Ignorance is like subzero weather: by a sufficient expendi-
ture its effects upon people can be kept within tolerable or even comfortable bounds, but it would be
wholly uneconomic entirely to eliminate all its effects." STIGLER, supra note 83, at 188.
210. Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect
Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 655 (1979).
211. Arthur, supra note 208, at 61.
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tion disparities, a context that involves obvious information problems
and avoids the gray area between adequate information and inadequate
information which complicates judicial line drawing. One study of Iowa
hog farmers, for example, indicates that price searching is very limited212
and that eighty-five percent of a farmer's hogs are sold to the same
packer, indicating little price shopping. 213 Commentators have noted
that "firms can exploit in numerous ways the bargaining power that the
lack of comparison shoppers confers on them." 214
The case for higher scrutiny for bargaining arrangements involving
farmers is provided for in the Kodak analysis. As one commentator
explained, "Kodak suggests that market power may be found wherever
ignorant buyers can be exploited through individualized bargaining," a
conclusion which could also apply to disorganized sellers. 215 While
launching a new public relations campaign, Cargill's head of public
affairs conceded the power of information in agricultural markets: "If
you look at our oldest business, which is grain trading, whoever has been
in that business has been reticent to talk about the details because a close
hold on trading information could be critical to profits." 216
The importance of information was also noted in the recent price re-
porting decision in South Dakota, in which a federal court acknowledged
that "only packers have complete knowledge of livestock purchases and
prices" and that "[o]nly a relatively small portion of livestock pur-
chasing and pricing information is available to the public, including
producers." 217
3. Post-Chicago Analysis
The buyer-power defense to mergers and the recognition of infor-
mation gaps in certain markets are part of a larger rethinking of antitrust
analysis. The greater consideration of complexities in antitrust cases has
become known as post-Chicago analysis. Herbert Hovenkamp is credit-
ed with the early criticism of Chicago theories that developed into
212. MARKET AccEss, 1995 SURvEY RESULTS 3 (Iowa Pork Producers Ass'n, In Cooperation with
Iowa State University) (on file with author). "Eighty-seven percent of the producers reported pricing
their hogs the day of, or the day before, delivery." Id.
213. Id. at 4; see also Merle D. Faminow et al., Errors in Slaughter Steer and Heifer Prices, 12
AGRIBUSINESs 79, 79 (1996) (noting that the "exploitation of informational asymmetries can be one
form of market power whereby agricultural processing industries can exploit farmers who sell to
them").
214. Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 210, at 667.
215. Arthur, supra note 208, at 15.
216. Jill J. Barshay, 'Invisible Giant' Cargill Speaks Up in New Ads, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis,
Minn.), Mar. 5, 1999, at DI.
217. American Meat Institute v. Barnett, No. 99-3017, 1999 WL 734962, at *2 (D.S.D. Aug. 31,
1999).
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post-Chicago analysis. 218 In the midst of the Reagan administration's
embrace of Chicago economics, Hovenkamp noted the serious limits to
Chicago thinking. In addition to noting the problems "outside" the
Chicago model, such as its flaunting of legislative history and its failure
to consider policies not related to economic efficiency, Hovenkamp
highlighted problems "inside" the Chicago model. 219 The latter in-
clude the questionable use of static methodologies that assume that
external factors will not affect a particular economic condition and the
failure to consider attempts by firms to minimize competition through
strategic behavior. 220 The consideration of different economic models
and factors in antitrust analysis reinforces the indeterminacy problem
which afflicts economices, justifying the consideration of non-economic
policy priorities. 221
Perhaps the most important aspect of post-Chicago analysis is what
one commentator describes as the "emergence of sophistication doc-
trine." 222 Instead of assuming economic rationality among all firms in a
market, some recent antitrust cases consider the presence of sophisticated
firms that possess "tactical expertise, knowledgeability, or intelli-
gence." 223 The consideration of a firm's sophistication involves an
"empirical, improvisational approach to corporate behavior" which al-
lows courts to consider the relative bargaining power between large food
processing firms and small, disorganized farmers. 224 In the case of agri-
business mergers, which often involve large, powerful firms, the sophisti-
218. Michael S. Jacobs, The New Sophistication in Antitrust, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1, 53 n.149 (1994)
(noting that the term "post-Chicago" "apparently originated in Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy
After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REv. 213 (1985)"). See generally Jonathan B. Baker, Recent Develop-
ments in Economics that Challenge Chicago School Views, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 645 (1989); Martin
Shubik, Game Theory, Law, and the Concept of Competition, 60 U. CN. L. REV. 285 (1991); Michael 0.
Wise, Antitrust's Newest "New Learning Returns the Law to Its Roots: Chaos and Adaptation as New
Metaphors for Competition Policy, 40 ANTrTRUST BULL. 713, 723-24 (1995).
219. Hovenkamp, supra note 50, at 233-55.
220. Hovenkamp, supra note 50, at 261.
The static market fallacy and the failure of orthodox Chicago School antitrust policy to
take strategic behavior seriously are closely related weaknesses in the market efficiency
model. Both errors result from the model's failure to appreciate time and change, and
the havoc these factors play with the economist's idea of competitive equilibrium, which
exists nowhere in the real world, or at least not for long.
Hovenkamp, supra note 50, at 261.
221. Michael S. Jacobs, An Essay on the Normative Foundations of Antitrust Economics, 74 N.C.
L. REV. 219, 225-26 (1995) (explaining how Chicagoans and post-Chicogoans have created a "stale-
mate in economic theory" which is "theoretically and empirically irresolvable" and calling for a
recognition of the political views underlying each school).
222. Jacobs, supra note 218, at 8.
223. Jacobs, supra note 218, at 2.
224. Jacobs, supra note 218, at 3; see also United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981,
985-86 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (contrasting buyers with "sophistication" with those "who may possess
imperfect information and limited bargaining power").
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cation consideration could substantially alter the outcome of antitrust
decisions, especially when combined with monopsony considerations. 225
Post-Chicagoans also complicate antitrust analysis by considering
insights from the field of game theory, which attempts to predict the
multiple strategic reactions of firms in various economic contexts. 226 In
contrast to Chicago economics, game theory suggests that firms can
grow to be dominant by raising rivals' costs, effectively managing preda-
tory pricing schemes and embracing certain advertising and investment
strategies. 227 Game theory also takes into consideration asymmetric
information among firms, the key insight of the Kodak case.228 Holders
of private information, such as large agribusiness firms with extensive
information-gathering abilities, maintain bargaining power and thus
enjoy greater economic gains. 229 Such insights are particularly valuable
in legal analysis since, as one commentator noted, the "law abounds with
instances in which small numbers of players who have private
information adopt strategies to further their well-defined interests. ' 230
Doubts about the wisdom of universal antitrust rules that apply in all
economic contexts 231 allow room for greater analysis in individual
antitrust cases. By considering the particulars of an antitrust case, post-
Chicago analysis makes it possible to weigh the unique economic factors
at work in agricultural markets. 232 The emerging buyer-power analysis,
for example, can be reversed so that seller-power becomes a consid-
225. David Barboza, DuPont Buying Top Supplier of Farm Seed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1999, at
C4 (providing an appropriate example of high sophistication levels).
DuPont Co., seeking to create an agricultural powerhouse to match its giant chemical
business, said Monday that it would pay more than $7.7 billion in cash and stock to buy
the remaining 80 percent of Pioneer Hi-Bred International, the world's largest producer
of seed corn .... If the, acquisition is approved by regulators, DuPont will take control of
the last remaining giant seed company, making DuPont a formidable competitor to
Monsanto Co., which has acquired more than $8 billion worth of large seed companies
over the last two years, adding the heft of being the world's largest seed company to its
strengths in herbicides and genetic research.
Id.
226. Hovenkamp, supra note 50, at 260-83; see also Chris Fawson et al., Price Impacts of Concen-
tration, Timing, and Product Characteristics in a Feeder Cattle Video Auction, 12 AGRiBUSINESs 485,
485 (1996) (noting that a "significant amount of evidence exists that suggests cattle buyers behave
strategically").
227. Jacobs, supra note 218, at 37-8.
228. Jacobs, supra note 22 1, at 242-43.
229. JOHN MCMILLAN, GAMEs, STRATEGIS, AND MANAGERS 61 (1992).
230. Ian Ayres, Playing Games with the Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1291, 1294 (1990).
231. Lawrence A. Sullivan, Post-Chicago Economics: Economists, Lawyers, Judges, and Enforce-
ment Officials in a Less Determinate Theoretical World, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 669, 670 (1995). A post-
Chicago analysis "faults Chicago results in specific particulars and raises doubts about the broader
inferences associated with Chicago antitrust thinking. It is far less likely to yield definitive conclusions
than is Chicago's use of more universal, less particularized and empirically informed antitrust models
and norms." Id.
232. Marion, supra note 112, at 443-47 (arguing that the "theory of strategic groups seems to be
much more consistent with reality than the superior efficiency [Chicago] explanation").
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eration. In the absence of seller-power, a common characteristic in
disaggregated agricultural markets, greater scrutiny can be applied to the
existence of a concentrated processing sector. A component of such an
analysis will be the information possessed by market actors. Instead of
assuming that something approaching perfect information will be
available to all actors, post-Chicago analysis can consider the vast dispar-
ity between the market information possessed by Farmer Brown and
Cargill, with its international network of buyers and sellers.
II. IN PARI MATERIA: THE WIDER STATUTORY BASIS FOR
REFORMULATING ANTITRUST
The disorganization of farmers has undermined their economic
position in society. Congress, state legislatures and the courts have often
recognized the problem of disorganization and attempted to meliorate its
effects. Such efforts and concerns, considered along with the purposes
of the antitrust laws and their recent interpretations, provide a conclusive
rationale for an agrarian antitrust which closely scrutinizes agricultural
markets and considers the importance of farmer bargaining power.
After reviewing the elements of farmer disorganization, this section
presents a number of statutes which clarify the purposes and intentions
of the antitrust laws as they apply to agriculture. The current chairman
of the Federal Trade Commission, Robert Pitofsky, understands the
importance of considering the wider goals of the antitrust laws and of
construing them comprehensively:
Using subsequent legislative history to illuminate the intent of
an earlier Congress seems particularly appropriate when we
deal with 'a comprehensive charter of economic liberty,' . . . It
also seems particularly appropriate because we deal with the
'antitrust laws'-an integrated network of statutes that
supplements and amends earlier versions-designed in toto to
govern marketplace competition. 233
Pitofsky invokes the Supreme Court case United States v. Hutcheson,234
which specifically interpreted the Sherman, Clayton and Norris-
LaGuardia Acts as "interlacing statutes." 235
233. Pitofsky, supra note 44, at n.3 1.
234. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
235. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232 (1941); see also Fairdale Farms, Inc. v.
Yankee Milk, Inc., 635 F.2d 1037, 1042-43 (2d Cir. 1980) (construing the Capper-Volstead Act in light
of subsequent agricultural statutes).
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The existence of agricultural statutes in pari materia, which "relate
to the same thing" as the antitrust statutes, requires that both be consid-
ered as "one law" in judicial decision-making. 236 Failing to consider
agricultural statutes eliminates critical factors to be considered in anti-
trust decisions and undermines the designs of legislators. 237 As a broad
principle, weighing an array of factors, including closely related statutes,
is recognized as an important component of balanced legislative
interpretation.2 38  If courts consider the wider statutory antitrust regime
and the particular problem it was designed to address, judicial decisions
can more properly reflect Congressional concern about economic
concentration and its negative impact on the bargaining power of
farmers .239
A. FARMERS AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL DILEMMA
The large number of farmers, their geographical dispersion and
their production of widely differing commodities has always left them
economically disorganized.240 Drafters of agricultural legislation have
recognized the "difficulties that inhere in [a farmer's] business, that
make cooperation and organization almost impossible." 241 Such dis-
organization, when matched against the concentrated economic power of
the agricultural processing industry, has resulted in prices lower than
would be paid to an economic sector with greater market power. Courts
considering the problem have acknowledged both the economic
236. United States v. Freeman, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 556, 564 (1845).
The correct rule of interpretation is, that if divers statutes relate to the same thing, they
ought all to be taken into consideration in construing any one of them, and it is an
established rule of law, that all acts in pan materia are to be taken together, as if they
were one law.
Id; see also 73 AM. JUR.2D Statutes § 187 (1974 & Supp. 1998).
[A]cts in pan materia, and all parts thereof, should be construed together and compared
with each other. Because the object of the rule is to ascertain and carry into effect the
legislative intent, it proceeds upon the supposition that the several statutes were governed
by one spirit and policy, and were intended to be consistent and harmonious in their
several parts and provisions. Under this rule, each statute or section is construed in the
light of, with reference to, or in connection with, other statutes or sections.
Id.
237. Freeman, 44 U.S. at 564 (explaining that "[tihe error" in the interpretation of a statute
"arose from that act having been considered by itself, without any reference to other statutes relating
to [similar concerns]").
238. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning,
42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 356 (1990).
239. Id. at 358 (emphasizing the importance of the purposive inquiry: "What problem was
Congress was trying to solve, and what general goals did it set forth in trying to solve it?").
240. HAROLD F. BREIMYER, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND THE ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION OF
AGRICULTURE 202 (1965) (explaining that "[i]n an economy of established power in the marketing
system, the individual farmer stands devoid of power in his own behalf").
241. 61 CONG.REC. 1038 (1921) (statement of Sen. Reavis).
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disorganization of farmers and Congressional efforts to alleviate its
effects.242
A core organizational problem is determining the best interests of
farmers. Over time, different groups have advanced numerous different
proposals as panaceas to the plight of the farmer. The Populists, for
example, were divided over the wisdom of the coinage of free silver, the
employment of government power and self-organization through the
promotion of cooperatives. 243 Any trappings of universal political pro-
grams quickly faded, however, as the movement waned. 244 In the 1920s,
when farmers made their most effective foray to date into politics, their
leaders were divided over the pursuit of export promotion policies, bank-
ing reforms and cooperative organization. 245 The problem of interest
identification intensified in the postwar period with the explosion of
242. Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 145 (1940).
These large sections of the population-those who labored with their hands and those
who worked the soil-were as a matter of economic fact in a different relation to the
community from that occupied by industrial combinations. Farmers were widely
scattered and inured to habits of individualism; their economic fate was in large measure
dependent upon contingencies beyond their control. In these circumstances, legislators
may well have thought combinations of farmers . . . presented no threat to the
community, or, at least, the threat was of a different order from that arising through
combinations of industrialists and middlemen.
Id.
243. SMITH, supra note 2, at 550 (explaining the divisions between Populists in 1896 over the
issues of free silver and greater government control of the economy); see also HOROWITZ, supra note
1, it 7.
[A]grarian reformers seemed to embody a near-paralyzing ambiguity. On one hand,
some Alliance activists hoped to use state power to curb monopoly and redistribute
wealth across the social spectrum. On the other, deep-seated fears over the use of co-
ercive government by wealthy plutocrats generated strong antistatist sentiments. Unable
to resolve the dilemma, the People's party relied on the silver issue in 1892.
HORowrrz, supra note 1, at 7.
244. HOFSTADTER, supra note 12, at 122-23.
The Populists had appealed in a rather touching way to the principle of universality: they
were working, they liked to think, for the interests of all toilers and certainly all farmers.
In fact the diversity of interests among American farmers was such that even to them this
could hardly apply; but the Populists' lip service to the idea was at least a tribute to their
belief in the traditions of agrarian democracy. With the passing of Populism and with the
frank twentieth century commercialization of American agriculture, the tone of farmers'
movements was completely transformed. The keynote was no longer the universality of
labor or of the farming interest, but the special crop, the special skill, the special
problem, the particular region, and above all a particular stratum of the farming
population.
HOFSTADTER, supra note 12, at 122-23.
245. See generally GILBERT FITE, GEORGE N. PEEK AND THE FiGHT FOR FARM PARITY (1954);
HoRowrrz, supra note 1, at 49-51.
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farm interest groups and the disaggregation of farmers into commodity-
specific organizations such as the National Wheat Growers and the
National Pork Producers Association. 246
A fundamental dividing point for many farm advocates involves the
invocation of state power. When the 1960s debate over federal legislation
to promote farmer bargaining power reached a boiling point, one of the
core issues which divided farm groups was the level of government
involvement and control. 247 Perhaps the most prominent antagonism
between farm groups on this issue is that between the Farmers Union and
the Farm Bureau, reflecting a conflict over the wisdom of using govern-
ment power to organize farmers. 248 The Farmers Union has typically
embraced the federal agricultural programs as critical to farmer organi-
zation, whereas the Farm Bureau has criticized such efforts and promot-
ed the self-organization of farmers. 249 Concerns over government
control also prompted the writing of the "Iowa Plan" in the mid-1990s
to end government controls on production, a proposal subsequently
codified in the "freedom to farm" legislation of 1996.
In addition to interest identification, farmer organization is compli-
cated by free riding. In the case of farmer cooperatives, for example, the
economically rational course to follow would be to allow other farmers
to organize cooperatively and then enjoy the benefit of any price
increases they may effectuate.250 If the cooperative effort fails, it costs
the free rider nothing.251 The possibility of free riding, its impact on the
effectiveness of collective organization and the recognition of this
situation by potential actors only exacerbates the problem of non-partici-
pation. The problem is further complicated in agricultural markets in
which the production of individual farmers is small, making individual
246. WmInAM BROWNE, CULTIVATING CONGRESS: CONSTITUENTS, ISSUES, AND INTERESTS IN AGRICUL-
TURAL POLICYMAKING 14-15 (1995); see also BREIMYER, supra note 240, at 189.
It is becoming increasingly difficult to sense the opinion that exists within the farming
community. This is true not only because there are several national farmers organiza-
tions and their positions differ, nor only because published resolutions may not reveal
accurately what a group's membership believes. It is difficult to learn the common
opinion of farmers because a common opinion scarcely exists. . . . [A]griculture is
becoming more fragmented into special-interest groups, thus reducing unity of attitudes.
BREIMYER, supra note 240, at 189.
247. Jon Lauck, The National Farmers Organization and Farmer Bargaining Power, 24 MICH.
HIST. REV. 89, 120-21 (1998).
248. BREIMYER, supra note 240, at 193-204.
249. BREiMYER, supra note 240, at 194-95.
250. MANCtu OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 126 (1965). "[I]f the individuals in any
large group are interested in their own welfare, they will not voluntarily make any sacrifices to help
their group attain its political (public or collective) objectives." Id.
251. Id. at 106. "As in any large, latent group, each individual in the class will find it to his
advantage if all of the costs or sacrifices necessary to achieve the common goal are borne by others."
Id.
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cheaters difficult to detect. 252 The existence of free riders makes it
counterproductive for some farmers to reduce production in order to
increase price and bargaining power.253 The tendency to be a free rider
is exacerbated by the number of sellers who can be played off against
one another by powerful buyers, reinforcing the monopsony prob-
lem.2 54 Congressional recognition of these organizational problems, in
tandem with concerns about the market power of buyers, has prompted
legislation.
B. THE PACKERS AND STOCKYARDS ACT
The same year that Congress passed the Sherman Act saw the
collapse of the American Cattle Trust, an organization of farmers which
attempted to build their bargaining power relative to meatpackers, high-
lighting the link between powerful meatpackers and poorly organized
farmers. 255 In subsequent decades, persistent worries about the concen-
tration problem and farmer bargaining power led to passage of the
Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act in 1914. Agrarian
concerns inhere in both statutes. The Clayton Act specifically limits the
anticompetitive practices which contributed to the economic
concentration that alarmed farmers, and it confers an antitrust exemption
upon farmer efforts to organize themselves economically. The Federal
Trade Commission Act created the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
with high expectations that some action would be taken against the "Big
Five" meatpackers. The resulting FTC report on the meatpacking
252. POSNER, supra note 48, at 286 (explaining how cheating can be profitable).
If the expansion of the market's total output brought about by cheating is small, the fall in
the cheater's profits resulting from the decline in the market price may be less than the
increase in his profits from selling additional units . . . Notice that the trick succeeds
because the cheater is small relative to the market; he can increase his own output
substantially without increasing the market output substantially and thereby causing a
steep fall in the market price and in the sales of his competitors. However, if other small
firms follow the cheater's lead, the cumulative impact on the market price and one the
sales of rivals, and hence on the profits of larger firms, will force them to cut their own
prices defensively, and eventually the market price will be driven down to the
competitive level.
POSNER, supra note 48, at 286.
253. OLSON, supra note 250, at 10 (noting the futility of a firm reducing output in industry with
declining profits: "If a firm, foreseeing the fall in price resulting from the increase in industry output,
were to restrict its own output, it would lose more than ever, for its price would fall quite as much in
any case and it would have a smaller output as well").
254. Venturini, supra note 167, at 10 (explaining, in a different context, how "[liarge buyers also
may play one seller off against the others to elicit price concessions. A strong buyer, large enough so
that the loss of his patronage is not a matter of indifference, is able to force concessions").
255. ALFRED D. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN
BusINEss 329 (1977).
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industry became the rationale for Congressional efforts to scrutinize
closely the workings of the meatpacking industry.
Congressional action took the form of a comprehensive federal
statute entitled the Packers and Stockyards Act [P&SA] of 1921, which
prohibited meatpackers from engaging in or using any "unfair, unjustly
discriminatory, or deceptive practice or device in commerce." 256 The
purposes and provisions of the statute require consideration when
enforcing the Sherman, Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts.
P&SA passed after these wider statutes became law, and Congress
specifically directed it toward a problem that seemed to persist despite
the existence of previous legislation. The Congressional intent to pro-
mote the combined consideration and construction of the antitrust
statutes is evidenced by the shared enforcement provisions of the
P&SA.257 Some courts have specifically held that the statute is designed
to go beyond the broad language of the Sherman, Clayton, and Federal
Trade Commission Acts, thereby recognizing the importance of con-
struing the statutes together. 258 While refusing to purchase a farmer's
livestock might be acceptable under the Sherman or Federal Trade
Commission Acts, for example, it would not be acceptable under the
broad protective purposes of the P&SA.259 In making such decisions,
courts have recognized the problem of monopsony that farmers face 260
and which Congress attempted to address in the P&SA.2 61
Furthermore, given its remedial nature, P&SA should be interpreted
liberally to carry out its broad mandate and purposes. 262 When com-
bined with the already broad language of the statute, enforcement
agencies are given wide regulatory powers over the meatpacking indus-
256. Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, 7 U.S.C. §§ 181-231 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
257. The PS&A even allowed for divided enforcement between the Secretary of Agriculture and
the FTC. The FTC was to enforce the "retail sales" provision of the statute but the Secretary could
assume responsibility if the FTC was not already proceeding with a similar investigation. 7 U.S.C. §
227 (1994). Per se illegality standards in the Clayton and FTC Acts carry over to P&SA. In re ITT
Continental Baking Co., 44 Ag. Dec. 748 (1985).
258. Wilson & Co. v. Benson, 286 F.2d 891, 895 (7th Cir. 1961).
259. Swift & Co. v. United States, 393 F.2d 247, 253 (7th Cir. 1968).
260. Id. at 250-52 (finding that buyers of lambs agreed not to pay over a certain price and that
buyers agreed not to bid against one another for lambs; the firm which bought the lambs then sold them
to another buyer which had agreed to not bid on the lambs).
261. Id. at 254. "The lack of competition between buyers, with the attendant possible depression
of producers' prices, was one of the evils at which the Packers and Stockyards Act was directed." Id.
(citing Meat Packer Legislation hearings before the House Committee on Agriculture, 66th Cong., 2d
Sess., pp. 22, 229, 250, 303, 1047, 2284 (1920)).
262. Glover Livestock Comm'n Co., Inc. v. Hardin, 454 F.2d 109, 111 (8th Cir. 1972) (describing
the legislation as remedial and requiring liberal construction to carry out its purpose of "prevent[ing]
economic harm to producers and consumers at the expense of middlemen") (citing Bruhn's Freezer
Meats of Chicago v. United States Dep't of Agric., 438 F.2d 1332 (8th Cir. 1971)); Bruhn's, 438 F.2d
at 1336 (citations omitted).
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try, 263 especially as it relates to injuries inflicted upon farmers. 264 One
contemporary commentator described the legislation as "extending
farther than any previous law in the regulation of private business." 265
The transfer of such power indicates the heightened Congressional
concern with meatpacker practices and the intent to intensely scrutinize
potential antitrust violations within the industry.
The language of the P&SA makes clear that courts should give
particularly close scrutiny to the marketing problems of farmers.
Borrowing heavily from the language of other antitrust laws, and again
confirming the interconnectedness of the antitrust legal regime, the
legislation prohibits "any unfair"266 practices or "any undue or unrea-
sonable preference or advantage" to certain sellers. 267 The act also
prohibits packer efforts to apportion supplies among them to avoid
bidding against one another if apportionment "has the tendency or
effect of restraining commerce or of creating a monopoly in com-
merce." 268 The statute also prohibits transferring articles 269 or engaging
in business practices "for the purpose or with the effect of manipulating
or controlling prices in commerce." 270 The number of practices that
can have an "effect" on prices approaches infinity, indicating the
intended sweep of the statute. Further, the "effect on price" provision
of the statute does not involve the requirement that a practice have the
"tendency or effect of restraining commerce or of creating a
monopoly." 27 1 This absence indicates, expressio unius, that the only
requirement for a violation of the provision is that a packer practice have
an "effect" on price.
The broad language of the statute has been used to advocate the
close regulation of vertical contracting between farmers and packers.
One commentator has suggested that vertical contracting could reduce
the number of buyers available to livestock sellers and therefore cause
263. Bruhn's, 438 F.2d at 1339. "The Act was framed in language designed to permit the fullest
controls of packers and stockyards which the Constitution permits, and its coverage was to encompass
the complete chain of commerce and give the Secretary of Agriculture complete regulatory power
over packers and all activities connected therewith." Id.
264. Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 514-15 (1922) (holding that the "chief evil feared is the
monopoly of the packers, enabling them unduly and arbitrarily to lower prices to the shipper who
sells").
265. Current Legislation, The Packing Industry and the Packing Act, 22 Colum. L. Rev. 68, 70
(1922) (quoting Senate Agricultural Comm., Rep. No. 77, 67th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1921)).
266. Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, 7 U.S.C. § 192(a) (1994).
267. Id. § 192(b).
268. Id. § 192(c).
269. Id. § 192(d).
270. Id. § 192(e).
271. Id. § 192(c).
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economic injury. 2 7 2 The suggestion relies on previous court rulings that
the broad mandate of the legislation obviates the need to prove an actual
"competitive injury" or a "lessening of competition." 273 Some courts
have found the plaintiff's burden is simply to show that a particular
packer practice is "likely to reduce competition and prices paid to
farmers." 274 Although such liberal standards have been narrowed in
other cases, the statute can still be used in an attempt to prevent a reduc-
tion in the number of packers that may reduce competition for the
farmer's product. 275 The possibility of such legal theories indicates the
wide-ranging power of the P&SA and underscores the Congressional
intent to take any antitrust concerns involving economic injuries to
farmers very seriously.
C. THE CAPPER-VOLSTEAD ACT
Among farmers in the late nineteenth century, a favored method of
responding to the economic concentration of buyers was the marketing
cooperative. 276 Formal government efforts to aid farmer cooperatives
came with the passage of the Clayton Act in 1914.277 In order to elimi-
nate legal obstacles that might slow the growth of market power among
farmers through cooperatives, the legislation specifically exempted
non-stock agricultural cooperatives from the antitrust laws. 27 8 The
inclusion of the farmer cooperative provision within an antitrust statute
offers further evidence of the importance Congress placed on consider-
ing the economic disorganization of farmers when applying the antitrust
laws. Doubts about the effectiveness of the Clayton Act exemption
triggered legislative efforts to draft a stronger statute. 279 The result was
the Capper-Volstead Act of 1922, which broadened the exemption from
the antitrust laws beyond non-stock cooperatives. 28 0 To be protected
from the antitrust laws, Capper-Volstead required that cooperatives allow
272. Douglas J. O'Brien, The Packers & Stockyards Act of 1921 Applied to the Hog Industry of
1995, 20 J. CORP. L. 651, 657 (1995).
273. Wilson & Co. v. Benson, 286 F.2d 891, 895 (7th Cir. 1961).
274. Farrow v. United States Dep't of Agric., 760 F.2d 211, 214 (8th Cir. 1985).
275. O'Brien, supra note 272, at 663.
276. SMrrH, supra note 2, at 431 (noting that "[iln the mood of defiance the farmers generated a
frenzy of cooperative activities: stores, marketing cooperatives, and even companies run on
cooperative principles to manufacture farm equipment," but also pointing out that most of them failed).
277. Clayton Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
278. Id. § 17.
279. Wendy Moser, Selective Issues Facing Cooperatives: Can the Customer Continue to be the
Company? 31 S.D. L. REv. 394, 395 (1986) (explaining that Capper-Volstead was passed to "clarify
the Clayton Act exemption provided to farmers").
280. Capper-Volstead Act of 1922, 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-292 (1994).
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members only one vote, that annual dividends be limited and that
non-member products could not exceed member products. 281
With the passage of Capper-Volstead, Congress demonstrated its
intention to treat farmer cooperatives differently from the typical corpo-
rate form and to give farmers the opportunity to build their bargaining
power relative to corporate buyers. 282 By exempting farmer coopera-
tives from the antitrust laws, Congress sought to help "farmers to com-
pete with large corporations." 283 According to some commentators, the
legislation was specifically designed to "counterveil the monopsony
power then held by the corporate purchasers." 284 The Supreme Court
agreed that "individual farmers should be given, through agricultural
cooperatives acting as entities, the same unified competitive advantage-
and responsibility-available to businessmen acting through corpora-
tions as entities." 285 Without fear of antitrust prosecution, farmers were
to unify into farmer cooperatives that could employ their bargaining
power to negotiate with large food manufacturers for better prices for
their products. 2 86
The jurisprudence interpreting the Capper-Volstead Act recognizes
the monopsony problem and farmer disorganization. The court in Kin-
281. 7 U.S.C. § 291
282. Fairdale Farms, Inc. v. Yankee Milk, Inc., 635 F.2d 1037, 1043 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting that
"agricultural cooperatives were 'a favorite child of Congressional policy') (quoting 5 TOuLMIN,
ANTrrRUST LAWS § 6.1, at 334 (1950)); see also Millon, supra note 64, at 1281.
The exemption of labor and agricultural combinations from the Sherman Act's
proscriptions further demonstrates that a deep concern about social balance lay beneath
statements of solicitude for those harmed by the trusts. Several senators advocated
exemption on the ground that such combinations were necessary to counterbalance the
economic power of massed capital.
Millon, supra note 64, at 1281; see also Michael D. Love, Antitrust Law-Fairdale Farms, Inc. v.
Yankee Milk, Inc.: -The Right of Agricultural Cooperatives to Possess Monopoly Power, 7 J. CORP. L.
339, 341 (1982) (explaining Congressional hopes of helping "cooperatives to finance business
operations of sufficient magnitude to compete with corporations"); Kathryn J. Sedo, The Application of
the Securities Law to Cooperatives: A Call for Equal Treatment for Non-agricultural Cooperatives, 46
DRAKE L. R Ev. 259, 272 (1997) (noting the farmer cooperative exemption from the securities laws,
indicating the Congressional view that cooperatives were favored organizations).
283. Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Prods. Co., 284 F.2d 1, 8 (9th Cir. 1960).
284. David L. Baumer et al., Curdling the Competition: An Economic and Legal Analysis of the
Antitrust Exemptions for Agriculture, 31 VILL. L. REV. 183, 185 (1986). "Congressional passage of the
agricultural antitrust exemption encouraged the formation of agricultural cooperatives intended to
counterveil the monopsony power then held by the corporate purchasers." Id.
285. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458, 466 (1960).
286. Note, Trust Busting Down on the Farm: Narrowing the Scope of Antitrust Exemptions for
Agricultural Cooperatives, 61 VA. L. REV. 341, 364 (1975) ("Capper-Volstead's authorization of
collective processing and marketing was an attempt to counter the bargaining power of oligopsonist
buyers, but the bargaining power gap is as wide today as it was fifty years ago"); James L. Guth,
Farmer Monopolies, Cooperatives, and the Intent of Congress: Origins of the Capper- Volstead Act, 83
AGRIC. HIsT., at 79 (1982) (noting the unsurprising hostility of processors to the Capper-Volstead Act:
"The National Wholesale Grocers Association took the lead in mobilizing grain dealers, millers, and
the food trade to inundate legislators with protests against this 'class legislation').
492 [VOL. 75:449
1999] AGRARIAN ANTITRUST 493
net Dairies, Inc. v. Dairymen, Inc.2 87 for example, noted that "farmers
needed congressional help" since they "had always been pricetakers,
standing relatively helpless before those who would purchase their pro-
ducts." 288 In order to overcome the monopsony problem common to
agricultural markets, Congress "deliberately set about to enable farmers
to organize and band together in order to acquire and exercise market-
ing power."289 If farmers can muster enough bargaining power, a
"bilateral monopoly" between seller and buyer will result, conferring
on farmers a fair price for their products.2 90 The mirror image of
promoting farmer bargaining power is close attention to economic activi-
ties that might increase the concentration among buyers and contribute
to their collusive potential. Accordingly, the wider policy rationale of
Capper-Volstead requires that courts apply strict scrutiny to mergers or
other activities that enhance monopsonistic power of buyers and worsens
the bargaining position of farmers.
D. AGRICULTURAL FAIR PRACTICES ACT
Congressional concerns about maintaining a balanced bargaining
arrangement between farmers and processors continued in more recent
decades with passage of the Agricultural Fair Practices Act (AFPA) of
1967.291 The statute was designed to prevent corporations from interfer-
ing in the formation of collective marketing organizations among
farmers. 292 Congressional action stemmed from episodes in which food
287. 512 F. Supp. 608 (M.D. Ga. 198.1)
288. Kinnet Dairies, Inc. v. Dairymen, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 608, 630 (M.D. Ga. 1981); Northern
Cal. Supermarkets, Inc. v. Central Cal. Lettuce Producers Coop., 413 F. Supp. 984, 988 (N.D. Cal.
1976) (noting that "Congress perceived farmers as being at the mercy of sharp dealers in the sale of
their produce and, therefore, made it possible for them to form cooperatives to help themselves").
289. Kinnet Dairies, 512 F. Supp. at 630. The court specifically mentions the promotion of
"countervailing power" as a function of farmer cooperatives. Id. at 614.
290. National Broiler Mktg Ass'n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, 842 (1978) (White, J.,
dissenting).
The specific goal of permitting agricultural organizations was to combat, and even to
supplant, purchasers' organizations facing the farmer. Economics teaches that the result
in such circumstances is 'bilateral monopoly' with a potentially beneficial impact on the
eventual consumer and a sharing of cartel profits between the organized suppliers and
the organized buyers
Id. (citing, ironically, the core of the Chicago school: Stigler, Friedman, and Becker). The court also
specifically mentions that chicken farmers exist in an "oligopsonistic" market. Id. at 844 (quoting
Charles Gordon Brown, U.S. v. Broiler Marketing Association: Will the Chicken Lickin' Stand?, 56
N.C. L. REV. 29,44 (1978)).
291. Agricultural Fair Practices Act (AFPA) of 1967, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2306 (1994); see also
Donald A. Frederick, Agricultural Bargaining Law: Policy in Flux, 43 ARK. L. REV. 679, 689 (1990)
(noting that the legislation was "viewed as an important sanction of agricultural bargaining" and was a
"congressional reaffirmation of the value of cooperative bargaining and marketing by agricultural
producers").
292. 7 U.S.C. § 2303 (forbidding corporations from coercing, discriminating, or intimidating
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processing corporations discriminated against cooperative bargaining
associations by refusing to conduct business with them. 293 Courts have
interpreted the "overriding purpose" of the resulting legislation to be
the protection of farmers' rights to cooperatively organize. 294 Through-
out the 1970s, Congress considered additional legislation to improve the
bargaining power of farmers relative to that of the corporate food
processing sector. 295  The AFPA's recognition of the disorganized
nature of farmer marketing 296 and the potential for abusive practices on
the part of agricultural processors adds further evidence of heightened
Congressional concern with market power among buyers.
E. BARGAINING POWER THROUGH VERTICAL EXCLUSION: CORPORATE
FARMING STATUTES
If farmers were to become highly organized and exert market
power over buyers, economic theory indicates that buyers would begin
to integrate backward into farming.29 7 Such moves are severely limited
by various corporate farming statutes, however, indicating a policy in
favor of building farmer bargaining power. Most of the statutes are
state-based, but no federal legislation limits their existence. 298 To the
contrary, a federal statute outlawing "corporate farming" was widely
debated in the 1970s. 29 9 In the fall of 1998, South Dakota adopted a
formal constitutional amendment forbidding the corporate ownership of
farm land. 300 Fears about corporate control over agricultural and the
members of farmer bargaining groups).
293. RANDALL TORGERSON, PRODUCER POWER AT THE BARGAINING TABLE: A CASE STUDY OF THE
LEGISLATIVE LIFE OF S. 109, at 3-17 (1970).
294. Butz v. Lawson Milk Co., 386 F. Supp. 227, 235 (N.D. Ohio 1974). "[Tlhe overriding
purpose of Congress in enacting the Agricultural and Fair Practices Act of 1967 was to protect the
individual producer of milk in his right to band together with other producers or, in effect, to
unionize." Id. But see generally Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n, Inc. v. Agricultural Mktg &
Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461 (1984) (using AFPA to preempt stronger state bargaining law which
required producers to sell their products on association terms).
295. National Broiler Mktg Ass'n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, 837 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (noting the "persuasive evidence that Congress' concern for protecting contract growers
vis-h-vis processors and handlers has not abated"). See generally Frederick, supra note 287, at
691-93; Oliver & Snyder, Antitrust, Bargaining, and Cooperatives: ABC's of the National Agricultural
Marketing and Bargaining Act of 1971, 9 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 498 (1972).
296. 7 U.S.C. § 2301.
297. Robert W. Pratt, The "Sophisticated Buyer" Defense in Merger Litigation Gains Momentum,
6 ArITRUST 9, 12 (1992) (listing the ability to vertically integrate as an indicator of buyer power and
sophistication).
298. Keith D. Haroldson, Two Issues in Corporate Agriculture: Anticorporate Farming Statutes
and Production Contracts, 41 DRAKE L. REV. 393, 402 (1992) (noting the existence of corporate
farming restrictions in Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Wisconsin,
Nebraska and Oklahoma).
299. See generally Senator James Abourezk, Agriculture, Antitrust and Agribusiness: A Proposal
for Federal Action, 20 S.D. L. REv. 499 (1975) (outlining legislation which would prohibit corporate
ownership of farm land); Jon K. Lauck, The Corporate Farming Debate in the Post-World War 11
Midwest, 18 GREAT PLAINS Q. 139, 148-49 (1998) (explaining the nature of the legislative debate).
300. S.D. CONST. art. XVII, § 21. "No corporation or syndicate may acquire, or otherwise obtain
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''great inequality in bargaining power and information between the
parties" have also triggered statutes governing production contracts
between farmers and buyers. 301 Such statutes reinforce the high priority
policymakers have placed on protecting the market position of farmers.
The statutes also reinforce the importance policymakers place on
non-economic considerations in antitrust. 302
III. REFORMING ANTITRUST
A. THEORY OF AGRARIAN ANTITRUST
Antitrust cases involving agricultural markets require a unique set of
considerations. Unlike other industries that may not have existed at the
time of the passage of the Sherman Act, agriculture maintains a special
status as an industry that heavily influenced passage of the original anti-
trust legislation. The Congressional response to agrarian concerns indi-
cates that farmers were specifically considered as a group that suffered
or could suffer antitrust injuries. Such a status partially explains the
continued clamor in agricultural circles for antitrust action to address the
economic woes of the farmer.
Antitrust law, particularly in recent decades, has failed to consider its
agrarian grounding. The incorporation of Chicago economic theories
into antitrust analysis has failed to take structure as a serious factor in
decisionmaking. As a result, the non-economic considerations Congress
advanced, such as decentralization, have been spurned, contributing to a
persistence of concentration in many sectors of the economy. The
monopsonistic relationship between some sellers and buyers, a structural
consideration of particular import to farmers, has therefore not been
widely recognized by the courts.
In the future, courts should weigh the agrarian origins of the
antitrust laws and the importance of structural factors when deciding
agrarian antitrust cases. In so doing, courts can elaborate on recent
developments in antitrust law, mostly outside of the agricultural context,
which question the usefulness of Chicago analysis. By applying the
information analysis of Kodak, courts can take into account the power
an interest whether legal, beneficial, or otherwise, in any real estate used for fanning in this state, or
engage in farming." Id. See also generally Dirk Johnson, Growth of Factory-Like Hog Farms Divides
Rural Areas of the Midwest, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1998, at A12 (detailing growing concerns about
concentrated hog production in South Dakota and efforts to limit its growth through referendum).
301. Neil Hamilton, State Regulation of Agricultural Production Contracts, 25 U. MEM. L. REV.
1051, 1054 (1995); Edward P. Lord, Fairness for Modern Farmers: Reconsidering the Need for
Legislation Governing Production Contracts, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1125, 1155 (1998) (advocating
stronger legislation to "increase [farmers'] bargaining power").
302. Brian F. Stayton, A Legislative Experiment in Rural Culture: The Anti-corporate Farming
Statutes, 59 UMKC L. REV. 679, 687-90 (1991) (emphasizing social considerations).
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differential between farmers who lack information about market
conditions and large processing firms who have more information than
any other entity in the market.
The possession of information is also a component of "sophis-
tication" analysis, which does not naively assume an equal footing for
market actors, rather recognizing that mom and pop often exist within
markets alongside a multi-billion dollar multinational firm. Such a firm
possesses bargaining power over those who sell to it, explaining why
some courts allow the merger of large sellers when a "power-buyer" is
present in an adjacent market. It also explains why a few courts have
considered the existence of monopsony power. The emergence of
"post-Chicago" antitrust analysis allows for greater consideration of the
particulars in antitrust cases, lending further legitimacy to the analysis of
factors such as information availability and firm sophistication. Finally,
courts can overcome a major oversight in past antitrust cases involving
farmers: the failure to consider the range of agricultural statutes de-
signed to supplement the antitrust laws and bolster the relative bargain-
ing power of the individual farmer, historically disorganized and suscep-
tible to monopsony power. In a variation on "Carolene group" protec-
tion, the antitrust statutes should be interpreted where possible to
strengthen farmer bargaining power.303
B. THE POVERTY OF MERGER ANALYSIS IN THE AGRICULTURAL
CONTEXT
While an agrarian theory of antitrust has applications in all areas of
antitrust law, it has particular relevance in merger analysis. The Sherman
Act was motivated by a concern about mergers and their impact on levels
of economic concentration. 304 Twenty-four years later, similar concerns
motivated passage of the Clayton Act, 305 which embraced merger regula-
tion as a method of stopping economic concentration in its "incipiency
303. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007,
1032 (1989) (noting a "special rule of statutory interpretation [which] is not stated as such in any of
the [Supreme] Court's decisions but can be discerned from their overall pattern: Statutes affecting
certain discrete and insular minorities 'Carolene groups'-shall be interpreted, where possible, for the
benefit of those minorities") (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938)).
304. PHILLiP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTrRusT LAW 1 901, at 2 (1980). "[lI]t was a series
of mergers, virtually monopolizing several leading industries, that was primarily responsible for the
passage of the Sherman Act." Id.; see also GRANT ET AL, supra note 10, at 16. "It was the rampant
merger activities of the railroads and, later, the oil companies that prompted the original antitrust
legislation at the turn of the century." GRANT ET AL., supra note 10, at 16.
305. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 124 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(concluding that the Clayton Act was passed "because Congress concluded that the Sherman Act's
prohibition against mergers was not adequate").
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before consummation." 306 Still concerned with concentration levels and
the frequency of mergers that compounded concentration, Congress
passed the Celler-Kefauver Antitrust Amendments in 1950, prohibiting
corporate mergers the effect of which "may be to substantially lessen
competition." 307 Congress again intended the merger provisions to
serve as a "prophylactic measure" 308 which could "cope with monopo-
listic tendencies in their incipiency," 309 choosing to focus on "probable
harm [to competition] rather than actual harm." 310 The Congressional
mood is even reflected in the title of the law, a self-proclaimed "Anti-
merger Act."
In the 1960s, courts met Congressional hopes for a restrictive
merger policy. In United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 311 for
example, a merger was found to be presumptively illegal if it caused a
"significant increase in [market] concentration." 312 In United States v.
Von's Grocery,3 13 the Supreme Court disallowed a merger between firms
that would have had a mere 7.5 percent post-merger market share. 314 In
Von's, the Court sought to "prevent economic concentration in the
American economy by keeping a large number of small competitors in
business." 315 In subsequent years, after the adoption of the merger
guidelines by the Department of Justice, merger cases continued to focus
on structural considerations such as market share. 316
Unlike the restrictive merger policies of an earlier generation of
cases, however, the current inquiry does not end with the consideration
of structural factors. Enforcement agencies now extend their analysis
beyond concentration levels, weighing a "variety of economic factors"
which could determine the anticompetitive effect of a merger. 317 Such
306. S. REP No. 698, at 1 (1914).
307. See Celler-Kefauver Antitrust Amendment of 1950, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994 & Supp. 1997)
(emphasis added).
308. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 597 (1957).
309. S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., at 4-5 (1950).
310. Cargill, 479 U.S. at 125 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Phillip Areeda, Monopolization,
Mergers, and Markets: A Century Past and the Future, 75 CAL. L. REV. 959, 976 (1987) (noting that
"[b]ecause we are able to do so little to prevent the anticompetitive operation of existing oligopolies,
the policy of section 7 is prophylactic and designed to prevent oligopoly from arising or surviving").
311. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
312. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963).
313. 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
314. See generally United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
315. Id. at 275. See also generally United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966)
(blocking the merger of the 10th- and 18th-largest brewers).
316. Andrew Chin, Antitrust By Chance: A Unified Theory of Horizontal Merger Doctrine, 106
YALE L.J. 1165, 1170-72 (1997). The first merger guidelines were adopted in 1968. Id.
317. Id. at 1171. The merger guidelines of the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of
Justice declare that "market share and concentration data provide only a starting point," adding the
assessment of "other market factors that pertain to competitive effects, as well as entry, efficiencies
and failure." Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines §
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factors include the potential efficiencies generated by the newly-
combined firm3 18 and the ease of entry into the merged firm's
market. 3 19 Enforcement agencies do not adopt unique considerations
for agribusiness mergers. 320
Despite greater sophistication in recent years, the economic analysis
of mergers has never overcome the shortcomings outlined by Derek Bok
in the earliest stages of commentary on section 7 of the Clayton Act. In
1960, Bok maintained that the "the problem of indeterminateness,"
discussed earlier, would undermine any attempts to assess the probable
competitive consequences of a merger.321 The commentary of two of
the foremost scholars in the field of antitrust law indicates the subjectivi-
ty, randomness, and pure chance of economic analysis in the context of
conglomerate mergers, with no apparent irony:
Th[e indeterminacy] problem could be moderated by the use
of presumptions. One could, for example, adopt the presump-
tions earlier set forth. Yet one might remain skeptical; pre-
sumptions will not simplify the matter if rebutting economic
evidence is allowed. On the other hand, conclusive presump-
tions could cover far too much. That result might not be cause
for great concern if such mergers never benefitted the
economy, but they sometimes do.322
2.0, reprinted in COLLABORATING AMONG COMPETITORS: ANTITRUST POLICY AND ECONOMICS 1004 app.
(1991) [hereinafter Merger Guidelines].
318. Merger Guidelines § 4 supra note 318; see also Robert M. Vernail, One Step Forward, One
Step Back: How the Pass-On Requirement for Efficiencies in FTC v. Staples Undermines the Revisions
to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines Efficiencies Section, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 133, 133-34 (1998).
"Early enforcement agency Guidelines treated efficiency claims with great skepticism, but the
recently revised Efficiencies Section in the current Horizontal Merger Guidelines clearly
acknowledges the potential benefits of efficiencies." Vemail, supra, at 133-34.
319. Merger Guidelines § 3 supra note 318; see also Malcolm B. Coate, Evaluating Mergers in
Food Industries Under Procedures for Litigation or Regulation, in STRATEGY AND POuCY IN THE FOOD
SYSTEM: EMERGING ISSUES, PROCEEDINGS OF NE-165 CONFERENCE, JUNE 1996, at Ill (Food Marketing
Policy Center, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Connecticut &
Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst),
available at <http://agecon.lib. umn.edu/nel65/nel65968.pdf> (last visited Aug. 16, 1999) (explaining
how food company mergers tend to focus on market definition, market entry, and efficiencies, making
no allowance for supplier considerations).
320. When analyzing meatpacking mergers, an attorney for the Antitrust Division recounted the
standard list of factors that would be considered, making no allowance for supplier considerations.
Willie L. Hudgins, Merger Analysis in the Beef Packing Industry, Speech to the National Meat
Association (February 1996) (on file with author).
321. Bok, supra note 7, at 228 (explaining that "economists, as well as lawyers, lack the knowl-
edge to make predictions concerning the probable consequences of many of the mergers"); Vernail,
supra note 318, at 141 (noting that the 1968 merger guidelines recognized "there usually are severe
difficulties in accurately establishing the existence and magnitude of economies claimed for a
merger").
322. Phillip Areeda & Donald Turner, Conglomerate Mergers: Extended Interdependence and
Effects on Interindustry Competition as Grounds for Condemnation, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1082, 1103
(1979).
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More recent commentators have recognized this difficulty with
particular reference to the efficiencies defense in merger cases. 323
Despite alleged advancements in economic theory324 and the ubiquity of
"efficiency" as a justification for business activities, 325 it is still extreme-
ly difficult to predict the existence of efficiencies in a merged firm. As
FTC chairman Robert Pitofsky has noted, the efficiencies defense is
"easy to assert and sometimes difficult to disprove." 326 One court has
termed efficiency claims by defendants in merger cases "speculative
self-serving assertions." 327 Doubts about the competitive consequences
of mergers and efficiency claims and the problems of proof both present
have even crept into the analysis of Chicago school stalwarts such as
George Stigler, Richard Posner and Robert Bork. 328 The most reliable
source of doubt about efficiency claims is the poor economic record of
mergers. 329 The largest merger of the 1980s, for example, was recently
323. Fisher & Lande, supra note 48, at 1596 (1983) (noting that "efficiencies still are enormous-
ly difficult to predict on a case-by-case basis and... balancing problems remain at least as difficult as
the courts had anticipated earlier"). The merger guidelines adopted section 4 "Efficiencies" in 1997.
324. Fisher & Lande, supra note 48, at 1583, 1596 (explaining the efficiency argument as emerg-
ing from claims about better information/theory about their effect, especially the work of Oliver
Williamson).
325. Louis B. Schwartz, Institutional Size and Individual Liberty: Authoritarian Aspects of
Bigness, 55 Nw. U. L. REV. 4, 17 (1960). Schwartz criticizes
[the] hypnotized respect for the efficiency of corporate giants as the modem analogue
of the deference paid in other days to the 'divine right' of kings, or the magical powers
of wizards. In all ages humanity has attributed to the major temporal powers of its day a
mythical sanction which, so-to-speak, legitimates it.
Id. The new term is "synergy."
326. Joseph Kattan, Efficiencies and Merger Analysis, 62 AN'IRUST L. J. 513, 514 (1994).
327. FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1301 (W.D. Mich. 1996), aff'd, 121
F.3d 708 (6th Cir. 1997).
328. Bok, supra note 7, at 258 n. 133 (noting that even Stigler wanted to draw a line against mer-
gers which create 20 percent market share or more); see also RICHARD PosNER, A NTITRUST LAW: A N
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 112 (1976) (concluding efficiencies measurement to be "an intractable subject
for litigation"); Stephen Calkins, Panel Discussion, Economic Concepts and Antitrust Analysis: A Criti-
cal Reexamination, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 91, 95 (1987) (explaining that "several scholars are starting to
question the basic assumption that mergers generally enhance efficiency-the assumption that pro-
vides much of the popular and intellectual support for a liberal merger policy"); Kattan, supra note
326. at 520 (explaining that the evidentiary problems with efficiency analysis "led then-Professors
Posner and Bork, the two most influential exponents of the Chicago School's efficiency-based antitrust
analysis, to argue against recognizing any kind of efficiencies defense").
329. SULLIVAN & HoVENrKAMP, supra note 82, at 824 (noting growing evidence that "firms who
have experienced recent mergers actually perform more poorly than other firms in the same
market"); Brodley, supra note 108, at 576 (noting a "recent review of economic studies [which]
concluded that projections of merger efficiencies were 'surprisingly and consistently inadequate' and
that, despite near-unanimous predictions of future profit, fully 60-80% of mergers were unsuccessful
ex post"); Claudia H. Deutsch, The Deal is Done. The Work Begins, N.Y.TIMEs, Apr. 11, 1999, at
section 3, page 1 (explaining that "researchers routinely say that anywhere from one-half to three-
quarters of mergers never provide the low costs, added market share or other benefits that manage-
ment promised-or that they take much longer than expected to do so"); Peter Passell, Do Mergers
Really Yield Big Benefits?, N.Y.TIMEs, May 14, 1998, at D5 (reporting that the "most comprehensive
study of conglomerate mergers . . . found that the profitability of acquired companies on average
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reversed, earning a high rank in "the century's pantheon of financial
ignominy ."330
Debating the economic effects of mergers also crowds out the
consideration of other policies undergirding the anti-merger provisions
of the antitrust laws. In passing the Celler-Kefauver Amendment in
1950, Congressional action was premised on concerns about economic
concentration and the tendency of mergers to further increase concen-
tration. 331 Congress was concerned about the effects of concentration on
personal freedoms, the disappearance of small businesses and the impact
of concentrated economic power on democratic institutions, 332 and
"efficiency was of small concern." 333  Thus, failing to consider
non-economic concerns undermines the broader purposes and concerns
of the statute. 334 The prominence of these considerations led courts in
declined"); Peter Passell, When Mega-Mergers Are Mega-Busts, N.Y.TIMES, May 17. 1998, at 18
(Week in Review Section) (reporting that "most of the hard evidence from past mergers, along with
the anecdotal evidence from the current wave, suggests that mergers do as much harm as good").
Passell notes that mergers "are too often the progeny of executive megalomania and deal makers's
dreams of year-end bonuses." Passell, supra at 18; see also Francis Declerck, Did LBOs Create Value
in US Food Industries in the 1980s?, II AGRIBUSINEss 523, 536 (1995) (concluding that leveraged
buy-outs in the food industry during the 1980s produced companies that "could not service their debt
and have tried to reduce their debt either by divesting, restructuring their debt, or returning to public
ownership").
330. Bryan Burrough, RJR Nabisco, an Epilogue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1999, at A23 (explaining
the spinoff of R.J. Reynolds tobacco from Nabisco); see also A Disastrous Merger, Editorial,
N.Y.TMES, Feb. 12, 1999, at Al (explaining the failure of the BMW-Rover merger: "The lesson of
BMW should remind them that mergers often do not work out as planned, and that savings are easier
to anticipate than to realize"); Albert A. Foer, Making Antitrust Tougher; Playing Monopoly, NEW
REPUBLIC, Apr. 12, 1999, at 16 (noting that in 1995, "when the Union Pacific and Southern Pacific
Railroads wanted to merge, they projected huge efficiency gains. Within a year after the merger,
however, the new railroad was plagued with logistical problems").
331. Bok, supra note 7, at 234-35.
332. Bok, supra note 7, at 236. The following is an explanation of the "sociological arguments"
underlying the legislation:
The ill effects of big business on initiative and individuality were forcefully described.
There were arguments that concentration narrowed the opportunity to have one's own
business, depressed local initiative and civic responsibility, and diminished the scope of
entrepreneurship by forcing small businesses to become ever more subject to the dictates
of large concerns.
Bok, supra note 7, at 236 (explaining the concern about democratic institutions).
333. Fisher & Lande, supra note 48, at 1592; see also Bok, supra note 7, at 318.
There is little basis for concluding that the achievement of lower costs as such should
give rise to favored treatment under section 7. The possibility of lower costs was
brushed aside in the legislative deliberations and there is every reason to believe that
Congress preferred the noneconomic advantages of deconcentrated markets to limited
reductions in the cost of operations.
Bok, supra note 7, at 318.
334. Bok, supra note 7, at 247.
Nevertheless, it seems abundantly clear that 'competition' meant far more to Congress
than prices, costs, and product innovations. Hence, where economic doctrine is to be
applied, it must be a doctrine which takes account of the broader range of interests
which Congress had in mind if the statute is to be fairly interpreted.
Section 7 was amended for the purpose of achieving and safeguarding the values
expressed in the legislative history, and any rule which resolves uncertainties in a
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the 1960s and 1970s to condemn mergers, despite possible efficien-
cies. 335 Judicial deference to Congressional concerns about mergers
contributing to economic concentration was wise, especially in light of
the inability to confirm or deny the presence of economic efficiencies.
A merger analysis that devolves into irresolvable economic theoriz-
ing and fails to weigh structural considerations undermines agrarian
antitrust. Failing to consider concentration levels per se diminishes the
importance of the overall bargaining context. The calculation of eco-
nomic outcomes, which often involves solely a debate over the potential
for price increases, and the consideration of efficiencies also indicates a
decidedly pro-consumer bias in merger analysis, offering little or no
opportunity to consider the negative impact of a merger on suppliers. A
possible component of an efficiencies defense, for example, is that a
merged firm will be able to maintain "bargaining advantages" over
other economic actors. 336 Such an argument implicitly recognizes that
those who sell to a large firm resulting from a merger will often be at a
disadvantage, but it fails to consider the impact on suppliers as an
autonomous factor in merger analysis.
A stricter merger policy in the past could have made a critical
difference to the industrial structure of farm product buyers. 337 In the
early part of the century, the food industry was defined by numerous
small firms that started to grow larger and more powerful in the 1920s,
partly through merger.338 In the postwar period, concentration concerns
manner contrary to those desires threatens to give to section 7 a significance and an
impact on the economy which differs from what was envisaged by the Congress.
Bok, supra note 7. at 305.
335. FTC v. Proctor & Gamble, 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967) (finding that "[p]ossible economies
cannot be used as a defense to illegality. Congress was aware that some mergers which lessen com-
petition may also result in economies but struck the balance in favor of protecting competition");
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (stating that "Congress appreciated that
occasional higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and
markets. It resolved these competing considerations in favor of decentralization"); see also Fisher &
Lande, supra note 48, at 1586 (noting that "[tihe Court therefore chose to resolve the [market
power/efficiency] tradeoff problem by following the congressional directive to err on the side of strict
enforcement of the antimerger laws"); Vemail, supra note 318, at 139 (explaining that the Supreme
Court first considered the efficiencies issue in Brown Shoe).
336. Brodley, supra note 108, at 581.
337. Bruce W. Marion, Government Regulation of Competition in the Food Industry, 61 AM. J.
AGRIC. ECON. 178, 180 (1979) (explaining that "[tihere is rather convincing evidence that the Celler-
Kefauver Amendment has affected and can still significantly affect the structure of markets if it is
vigorously enforced"). Marion also notes that most antitrust activity in the chain from farmer to con-
sumer takes place in manufacturing and food retailing, with "little interest until recently in producer-
first handler markets." Id. at 181; see also Willard F. Mueller, Market Power and Its Control in the
Food System, 65 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 855, 858 (1983) (finding that "[g]iven the modem corporation's
insatiable appetite for growth by merger, the absence of strict prohibitions on horizontal mergers
would doubtless have led to much greater concentration in most food retailing and manufacturing
markets").
338. A.C. Hoffman, The Organization and Performance of the U.S. Food System in THE
ORGANIZATION AND PERFORMANCE OF THE U.S. FOOD SYSTEM, at xix-xxv (Bruce Marion ed., Lexington
1986).
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became more pronounced as the number of food manufacturers
dropped by over fifty percent from 1947 to 1972.339 Then, in the
mid-1960s, "an avalanche of mergers broke loose in the U.S.
economy" referred to as "merger mania," 340 and from 1971-1975
food-tobacco manufacturing firms made twenty-five percent of all large
manufacturing acquisitions. 341 A.C. Hoffman, an early pioneer in the
field of competition in the food industries, claimed that "[n]ever before
in the history of capitalism [had] such great aggregations of economic
power been created." 342 The abandonment of Warren-era merger
policies by enforcement agencies and the courts, which "virtually
[stopped] all but very small mergers by the leading ten food chains," 343
contributed to the "record volume of food manufacturing acquisitions"
in the 1980s.34 4 One study concluded that two-thirds of the increase in
339. Marion, supra note 337, at 181.
340. Russell C. Parker, Antitrust Issues in the Food Industries, 58 AM. J. AGRIC. EcoN. 854, 856
(1976).
The increase in aggregate concentration with the largest food manufacturers is strongly
related to mergers. When food company mergers were examined in 1966, it was found
that were it not for mergers the combined share of assets of the fifty largest food
manufacturers would have declined between 1950 and 1965 ... Since 1965 . .. mergers
have eliminated a significant percentage of the remaining number of independent
medium-sized and larger food manufacturers.
Id. Russell also notes that "FTC analysis [in 1966] of detailed product data for the twenty-five largest
food manufacturers indicated that nearly 90 percent of the product areas entered by the companies
were directly traceable to merger." Id. at 856. Russell concluded, "Merger enforcement policy
probably has more impact on industry structure and performance than any other single area of
enforcement." Id. at 858. Part of the problem with using merger policy to slow the growth of food
companies is that so many food industry mergers were product extension mergers instead of horizontal
mergers. Id. at 856. By the mid-1970s, however, the "principal conglomerate merger theories of
deep pocket and cross-subsidization, reciprocity, and entrenchment of leading firms [had] fallen on
hard times with respect to enforcement activity." Id. at 859.
341. Marion, supra note 337, at 181. During this period, profitability in food manufacturing was
13.2% of stockholder's equity, 11% higher than the rest of manufacturing. Marion, supra note 338, at
181-82. Marion worries about the market power of the food firms which emerged in the 1970s, noting
that their "market power-which is more heavily based upon product differentiation and
conglomerate-derived economic power than in previous periods-appears much less vulnerable to
erosion." Marion, supra note 337, at 182.
342. Hoffman, supra note 338, at xix-xxv. Marion, supra note 338, at 181.
343. Willard Mueller & Thomas Paterson, Policies to Promote Competition, in THE ORGANIZATION
AND PERFORMANCE OF THE U.S. FOOD SYSTEM 387 (Bruce Marion ed., Lexington 1986); see also Marion,
supra note 337, at 180.
344. Marion, supra note 337, at 180 (explaining that "[s]ince the mid-70s, the antitrust agencies
have relaxed their posture on food industry mergers. A recent surge in mergers by large grocery
chains appears to be a direct response"); see also Sandra 0. Archibald et al., Trends in the U.S.
Food-Processing Industry: Implications for Modeling and Policy Analysis in a Dynamic Interactive
Environment, 67 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON., 1149, 1153 (1985) (stating, "In recent years, the dominant form
of mergers have been conglomerate and concentric facilitated in part by less stringent enforcement of
antitrust laws"); The New Food Giants; Merger Mania Is Shaking the Once-Cautious Industry,
BUSINESSWEEK, Sept. 24, 1984, at 133 (explaining how food processing companies in the 1980s "took
advantage of the antitrust environment, more tolerant of big deals than it has been in decades, to
increase their size and marketing clout"); Jon Lauck, Competition in the Grain Belt Meatpacking
Sector after World War 11, 57 ANNALs OF IOWA 135, 147-8, 151-52, 158 (1998) (detailing the raft of
mergers which contributed to concentration in the meatpacking sector and noting that the "slowing of
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concentration levels during the 1980s could be explained by mergers
and acquisitions, many of which violated the Department of Justice's
own merger guidelines. 345
Throughout this period, very little attention was paid to farmer
organization in merger analysis. In Cargill v. Monfort, a major 1980s
Supreme Court case involving the merger of the second- and third-
largest beef packers, the issue of supplier interests was not even
considered. 346 The controversy stemmed from a lawsuit brought by
Monfort against Cargill, the second-largest beef packer, which was
attempting to acquire Spencer Beef, then the third-largest beef packer. 347
Monfort argued that the resulting firm would be able to price in a
manner that economically undermined Monfort. 348 The case thus
focused on the legitimacy of such an antitrust "injury." 349 The District
Court and the Court of Appeals accepted Monfort's argument that
Cargill would undercut Monfort's prices to retailers and outbid Monfort
for cattle from suppliers, causing a "price-cost squeeze" which would
injure Monfort.350 The Supreme Court, however, cited case law requir-
ing that the injury suffered by Monfort as a result of the merger actually
derive from a violation of the antitrust laws, not simply the merger itself,
and reversed the lower court holdings. 351 Such a holding is hardly
antitrust activities in the 1980s, together with the conglomeration of food processing, remains a
concern for farmers given potential abuses of market power and the often disorganized nature of
farmer marketing"). See generally William G. Shepherd, Causes of Increased Competition in the U.S.
Economy, 1939-1980, 64 REV. ECON. AtND STATS., 613, 613 (1982) (concluding that "[aintitrust policies
emerge as the strongest single cause of rising competition" in his study of market structure from 1958
to 1980).
345. Bruce Marion & Donghwan Kim, Concentration Change in Selected Food Manufacturing
Industries: The Influence of Mergers vs. Internal Growth, 7 AGRIBUSINEss 415, 427, 429 (1991); see
also Adesoji Adelaja et al., Predicting Mergers and Acquisitions in the Food Industry, 15 AGRIOSINEsS
1. 1-3 (1999) (noting the continuation of significant merger activity in the food industry). Consumers
are also affected by greater concentration. A recent study concluded that welfare losses due to
oligopoly power totaled $15 billion in 1987. Sanjib Bhuyan & Rigoberto A. Lopez, Oligopoly Power
and Allocative Efficiency in US Food and Tobacco Industries, 49 J. AGRIC. ECON. 434, 441 (1998).
346. See generally Cargill v. Monfort, 479 U.S. 104 (1986).
347. Id. at 106-07.
348. Id. at 107. Monfort advanced two theories of injury based on price. First, Cargill would
lower prices to a point close to cost which would force Monfort to follow suit, causing Monfort to lose
profits. Second, Cargill would price below cost by drawing on its greater resources until Monfort was
driven from the market. Id. at 114, 117.
349. Id. at 108.
350. Id. Monfort alleged that the financial power of Cargill would allow it to carry out the plan
long enough to drive smaller competitors from the market. Id. at 114.
351. Id. at 109 (citing Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977)).
Justice Stevens made a strong case for distinguishing between a section four claim for treble damages
claim, which should require Brunswick-type injury, and a section seven claim for injunctive relief,
which should only require a "threatened harm." Id. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Monfort's
complaint was based on section 16 of the Clayton Act, which only required the showing of a
"threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws." Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1994 &
Supp. 1997). The majority did not reach the section 7 controversy since Monfort could not prove the
required injury under section 16. Cargill, 479 U.S. at 122. The majority conflated the injury
requirements under sections 4 and 16, holding that they both must involve an "injury of the type the
antitrust laws were designed to prevent." Id. at 111. The majority holding relating to injury may also
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remarkable. The remarkable aspect of the case is that suppliers of cattle
to the newly-merged firm did not protest the merger. More recently,
after a decade of agribusiness consolidation and farmer concerns about
the concentration issue, an antitrust theory invoking agrarian concerns
was not employed by farmers or any other parties involved in a merger
of major cereal companies. 352 Suppliers should start protesting.
One possible approach would be to argue for a return to the Phila-
delphia National Bank (PNB) standard for mergers in the agribusiness
sector. In PNB, the Supreme Court stopped the merger of the second-
and third-largest banks in Philadelphia, holding that the combination of
large firms in a market created an inferential violation of section 7.353
Such a presumption, the court held, was particularly important in an
economic sector where concentration was increasing. 354 A similar pre-
sumption in the case of agribusiness mergers would address the historic
and contemporary concerns of farmers with the concentrated power of
their buyers, a consideration particularly important after the growth of
concentration in the last decade. A presumption would begin to compen-
sate for overlooking the impact on suppliers in recent cases such as
Cargill v. Monfort. Moreover, the presumption would tip the balance in
favor of farmers in merger cases which are prone to inconclusive deter-
minations about economic effects, more faithfully addressing Congres-
sional concerns about economic concentration and the bargaining power
of farmers. 355
C. APPLYING THE THEORY: THE CASE OF THE CARGILL-CONTINENTAL
MERGER
In the midst of the concerns over concentration in agriculture,
Cargill, Inc., the largest privately-owned company in the United States,
frustrate an agrarian antitrust.
352. See generally State v. Kraft General Foods, 926 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
353. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank (PNB), 374 U.S. 321, 365 (1963). The court also
noted the difficulty of reaching a decision given the "complex and elusive" nature of the economic
data. Id. at 362.
354. Id. at 367.
A fundamental purpose of amending [section] 7 was to arrest the trend toward concentra-
tion, the tendency to monopoly, before the consumer's alternatives disappeared through
merger, and that purpose would be ill-served if the law stayed its hand until 10, or 20, or
30 more Philadelphia banks were absorbed. This is not a fanciful eventuality, in view of
the strong trend toward mergers evident in the area.
Id. The court noted that the number of commercial banks in Philadelphia had declined from 108 in
1947 to 42 in 1963 and that the concentration level of the largest seven banks had grown from 6% to
9% during the same time period. Id. at 331.
355. See generally AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 304, at 977 (arguing that when confronting the
oligopoly question in merger cases, "enforcement authorities will and should ultimately settle toward
the more prohibitive side of the academic dispute, for the statute's prophylactic purpose means, I
believe, that we should be cautious in accepting the view that even significant concentration within a
market is not harmful").
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announced plans to acquire the grain trading operations of Continental
Grain Company, described as its "chief rival." 356 The purchase, which
is estimated to cost as much as $1 billion, would give Cargill an addition-
al six export terminals, twenty-seven river terminals and thirty-two
country elevators, increasing its total to three hundred grain facilities in
the United States. 357 As a result, Cargill would handle forty-two percent
of corn exports, one-third of soybean exports and twenty percent of
wheat exports. 358 The deal also increases Cargill's total storage capacity
to 566 million bushels, ahead of Archer-Daniels-Midland's 464 million
bushels. 359
Many farmers and farm advocates have voiced concerns over the
merger. Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman wrote to the Depart-
ment of Justice and indicated his "significant antitrust concerns" with
the deal. 360 Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) has noted that "many
farmers fear that further concentration in agribusiness will significantly
diminish competition from companies that buy, store and trade their
commodities." 361 Attorney General Mark Barnett of South Dakota and
Attorney General Mike Hatch of Minnesota both opposed the merger.
General Hatch argued that "ant itrust law has not fulfilled its promise to
prevent excessive market concentration. "362
Cargill responded to the expressed concerns by arguing that the
merger is beneficial. Cargill's President of North American grain opera-
tions argued that the merger "will allow us to better serve producers in
terms of how we buy grain, how we load and transport grain and how we
sell grain." 363 Another spokesperson argued that the merger will "allow
us to take costs out of the system and provide better service at lower
costs." 364 Focusing on consumer effects, the chairman of Cargill argues
that the merger "will extend farmers' reach into new markets and
356. George Anthan, Cargill Merger: Will It Reduce Competition or Help Producers? DES
MOINES REGISTER, Nov. 15, 1998, at 1; Cheryl Strauss Einhom, Double Trouble? Cargill-Conti Grain
Deal Worries Farmers, BARRON'S, Nov. 16, 1998, at 14. "Until now, Continental was Cargill's fiercest
competitor. By having one company owning both sets of storage facilities, farmers may receive less
for their grain." Anthan, supra, at 1.
357. Anthan, supra, at 1. Another estimate values the deal at $300 million. Janelle Carter,
Senators Worry About Cargill Merger, AP ONLINE, Nov. 14, 1998, available in 1998 WL 22418535.
358. Philip Brasher, Cargill Merger Worries Ag Secretary, APONLINE, Dec. 8, 1998, available in
1998 WL 23509170.
359. Cargill Grain Deal Concerns Farmers Union; It Fears Merger Will Hurt Prices, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis, Minn.), Nov. 13, 1998, at DI.
360. Carter, supra note 357.
361. Carter, supra note 357.
362. Letter from Mike Hatch, Minnesota Attorney General, to Joel Klein (May 7. 1999) (on file
with author); see also Letter from Mark Barnett, South Dakota Attorney General, to Joel Klein (May
11, 1999) (on file with author).
363. Anthan, supra note 356, at 1.
364. Carter, supra note 357.
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improve service to a world of increasingly demanding consumers." 365
The chief executive of Continental espoused the benefits that the two
companies combined assets would have for farmers and emphasized that
"[w]hat's important for farmers is to have the most efficiency." 366 The
invocation of consumer impacts and efficiency considerations shows that
officials for Cargill and Continental have anticipated the inquiries that
are common in current merger policy.
In July of 1999, the DOJ set forth its "Proposed Final Judgment"
in the Cargill-Continental merger case. 367 The DOJ took note of certain
"captive draw areas" where farmers were forced to sell almost
exclusively to Cargill or Continental. 368 Coin and soybean farmers in
North Dakota, South Dakota, Minnesota, Nebraska, and Iowa, for ex-
ample, must rely on competition in the Pacific Northwest between Car-
gill's port facility in Seattle and Continental's port facility in Tacoma. 369
DOJ quite obviously stopped Cargill's acquisition of Continental's facili-
ties in areas such as the Pacific Northwest where the acquisition would
leave only one major grain buyer. 370 In short, DOJ prevented duopoly
from devolving into monopoly. While recognizing a monopsonistic
consequence of the merger and preventing complete monopsonization
of some grain buying markets, the DOJ applied a very simplified and
generic merger analysis. It failed to recognize the great potential for
cooperation and collusion in heavily concentrated markets. It failed to
recognize the unique bargaining power disparity between disorganized
farmers and large-scale agribusiness firms. And it failed to respect a
series of statutes passed by Congress and state legislatures concerned
about the concentration problem in agricultural markets. DOJ's passivi-
ty has triggered pressure from farm groups and farm-state legislators for
a challenge to the merger by state attorneys general. 371
365. Margaret Taus, Cargill is Purchasing Rival's Grain Operations; The Deal, Which Faces
Regulatory Approval, Adds to Farmers' Worries, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Nov. !1, 1998, at 1.
366. Allen R. Myerson, Cargill Set to Buy Main Unit of Continental Grain, Its Chief Rival, WALL
STREET J., Nov. II, 1998, at C.
367. United States v. Cargill, Incorporated and Continental Grain Company, Civil No. 99 1875,
Filed July 8, 1999 <http://www.usdoj.govlatr/caseslf25002553.htm>. In accord with the Antitrust
Penalties and Procedures Act, the DOJ will take comments for sixty days after publication of the
Proposed Final Judgment in the Federal Register, which would allow comments until October 12th,
1999. Judge Gladys Kessler of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia will then
weigh certain factors to determine whether or not the judgment is in the "public interest." See United
States v. Microsoft, 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C.Cir. 1995).
368. Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Cargill, Incorporated and Continental Grain
Company, July 23, 1999, Case Number 1:99CV01875, at 4, < http:l/www.usdoj.gov/atr/caseslf2500/
2584.htm>.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 6-7.
371. States have the power to challenge the merger after federal enforcement officials have
arranged a consent decree. California v. American Stores Company, 495 U.S. 271 (1990) (allowing
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AGRARIAN ANTITRUST
If state attorneys general advance an agrarian antitrust theory when
challenging the Cargill-Continental merger they could scuttle the deal.
The concentration factor would weigh heavily against the merger, given
that Cargill and Continental occupy the top two positions in the export
market, Cargill with twenty percent and Continental with fifteen percent.
Plaintiffs could appeal to the Congressional intent to stave off concen-
tration by preventing the merger of large firms. Blocking concentration
trends in their incipiency would also avoid the puzzle of oligopoly. If
firm sophistication were a factor in the analysis, Cargill would occupy
the highest end of the spectrum, given its sheer size and its involvement
in many different economic sectors. 372 In terms of information, Cargill
commands an international network of agents in an industry known for
extreme secrecy. 373 Further, the merger would give Cargill control of a
large percentage of the Chicago Board of Trade's 79-million-bushel
storage capacity for wheat, corn and soybeans, giving it great influence
over an important source of price information for farm goods. 374
The Cargill-Continental merger presents the opportunity to seek a
new judicial merger policy that applies to agribusinesses. Plaintiffs
could seek a ruling that such a merger among major agricultural firms
that buy farm products is presumptively illegal, appealing to older cases
such as Philadelphia National Bank. Doing so would give structure its
appropriate weight as a consideration in antitrust cases. Instead of
accepting a school of economic analysis that tends to find most corpo-
rate activity competitive and efficient, a court could recognize the serious
limits on economic knowledge and prediction. It could weigh more
heavily developing theories of monopsony and sophistication as
rationales for finding large agribusiness mergers presumptively illegal,
more faithfully honoring Congressional intentions to err on the side of
California to challenge the merger of the largest and fourth largest grocery store chains after the
Federal Trade Commission had given its approval); see also ORGANIZATiON FOR COMPETITIVE MARK-ETS,
RESOLUTION ADOPTED AT ANNUAL METTING (Omaha, Neb.), Aug. 21, 1999 (on file with author);
Organization for Competitive Markets to Roger Fones, Dep't of Justice, Sept. 22, 1999, available at
<http://competitivemarkets.com>. Some attorneys general have expressed concerns about the judicial
approval of the consent decree. See Jeremiah W. Nixon to Roger Fones, Sept. 16, 1999 (on file with
author); Don Stenberg to Roger Fones, Sept. 7, 1999 (on file with author).
372. WAYNE G. BROEHL, CARGILL: GOING GLOBAL (1998); Ricardo Sookdeo, Inside America's
Biggest Private Company, FORTUNE, July 13, 1992, at 83-90 (describing the many operations of
Cargill); see also Liz Brissett, Still the One: CEO Micek Fights Battles Around World to Keep Cargill
on Top, CORP. REP., May 1999, at 32 (noting that at the end of fiscal year 1998 Cargill reported $51
billion in revenue, total assets of $25.8 billion, and employed 80,600 people in 60 countries).
373. See generally DAN MORGAN, THE MERCHANTS OF GRA.IN (1979).
374. Einhorn, supra note 356, at 14.
Cargill will now have a lot of information about the grain markets. Some say this may
allow it to influence the spread between cash and futures prices on the Chicago Board of
Trade because it will know how much grain will be delivered, or is currently stored, at its
CBOT sites each month.
Einhorn, supra note 356, at 14.
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decentralization in merger cases. Furthermore, such a judicial policy
would recognize the persistent Congressional imperative of promoting a
more balanced bargaining relationship between farmers and the buyers
of their products. Judicial acceptance of such an argument is more
likely given that concentration concerns have historically been expressed
in merger law. 375 Merger policy thus provides the most accessible outlet
for addressing concerns about concentration in agricultural markets and,
following Congressional concerns, addresses the problem before it
worsens.
IV. CONCLUSION
Farmers actively sought antimonopoly legislation in the late nine-
teenth century and have continued to support its application to the
present day. Due to the recent judicial embrace of certain economic
theories, however, the antitrust laws have failed to meet their expec-
tations. More recent developments in the interpretation of the antitrust
laws offer the opportunity to satisfy farmer expectations more com-
pletely. Greater judicial recognition of the limits of economic theory
and the existence of power imbalances within markets, especially in light
of legislative policies designed to promote the bargaining power of
farmers, presents the opportunity to establish an agrarian-specific
antitrust analysis.
375. SULLIVAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 82, at 738 (concluding the "principal antitrust device for
dealing with industrial concentration has been merger policy under section 7 of the Clayton Act").
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